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ABSTRACT 
While both Tanzania and Zambia have experienced significant economic growth in the 
21st century, Tanzania has been able to translate that growth into poverty reduction while 
Zambia has not. A contextual picture of the two countries’ economic growth trajectories 
is provided, with an emphasis on understanding how specific policies and changes in 
their governance have affected growth, poverty reduction, inequality, and overall 
development. After considering each respective country’s economic growth and 
constraints, the effectiveness in translating that growth into development, as espoused 
through national poverty reduction strategies, is reviewed. 
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The correlation between economic growth and poverty reduction is not absolute. 
Economic growth is defined as a rise in national income per capita, and it is generally 
correlated with growth in development or advancements in human welfare.1 As sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) has experienced positive growth relative to the world economy, 
why have some countries in SSA been able to translate that growth into reductions in 
poverty while others have not? Specifically, this thesis compares economic growth in 
post-independence Tanzania and Zambia, and examines how employment and income 
distribution have led to greater poverty reduction in Tanzania, but better socioeconomic 
outcomes in Zambia, which has actually grown faster. 
Poverty throughout the world is declining.2 Decreases in poverty are 
characterized by improved standards of living, development and quality of life. 
Approximately 25 percent of the world’s extremely poor, as defined by the World Bank, 
live in 27 countries.3 Twenty-six of these 27 countries are in SSA, which, as a region, is 
expected to continue growth in the medium-term to reach over 5 percent in 2014–2015.4  
Global development scholars continually examine the underlying determinants of 
poverty reduction in an effort to further enhance opportunities for the world’s poor. 
Direct correlations have been made between economic growth and increased 
development and subsequent poverty reduction.5 However, economic growth by itself is 
not sufficient for reducing poverty levels. Crucial avenues for initiating and sustaining 
growth, as well as ensuring its benefits are evenly distributed, include improving 
                                                 
1 Dwight H. Perkins et al., eds., Economics of Development, 7th ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2013), 14.  
2 The World Bank, Prosperity for All/Ending Extreme Poverty: A Note for World Bank Group Spring 
Meetings 2014 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014), 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRO 
SPECTS/Resources/334934-1327948020811/8401693-1397074077765/Prosperity_for_All_Final_2014. 
pdf.  
3 Ibid., 4.  
4 Maya Senussi and Rachel Ziemba, “Sub-Saharan Africa Outlook: Going Steady,” Roubini Global 
Economics, December 16, 2013, http://www.roubini.com. 
5 Michael Roemer and Mary Kay Gugerty, “Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?” Harvard 
Institute for International Development, March 1997, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnaca656.pdf.  
governance and soundly managing the economy.6 Positively correlating the development 
and social impacts of economic growth linkages will prove useful in harnessing the 
region’s continued growth to ensure it is inclusive and helps to improve human welfare 
and related social indicators. Inclusive growth policies harness prosperity for 
development.7 The challenge lies in understanding the necessary conditions and 
environment for inclusive growth. Economic growth and its exact correlation to poverty 
reduction remain debated, and debatable.8  
Tanzania and Zambia, two of the 17 emerging economies in SSA, are similar 
countries with significant percentages of their populations classified as extremely poor, 
yet they appear to be on different poverty reduction trajectories. In 2010, 68 percent of 
Tanzania’s population and 75 percent of Zambia’s population were classified as 
extremely poor.9 From 2000–2013, Tanzania’s average annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth was 6.7 percent, while Zambia’s was 7.0 percent; Zambia’s annual growth 
actually exceeded that of Tanzania in 2010 and 2011.10 Nevertheless, in the first decade 
of the 21st century, Tanzania’s poverty rate (measured as percent of population living on 
less than $1.25 a day) showed decreasing trends from 85 percent in 2000 to 68 percent in 
2007, while Zambia’s poverty rate actually increased from 65 percent in 2003 to 74 
percent in 2010, which equates to 7 million to 9.8 million people, respectively.11 What 
explains Tanzania’s ability to translate growth into poverty reduction, while Zambia’s 
growth does not appear to have had the same development impact?  
6 Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way (Washington, DC: Center 
For Global Development, 2010), 14–15.  
7 Elana Ianchovichina and Susanna Lundstrom, World Bank Note: What Is Inclusive Growth? 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/ 
468980-1218567884549/WhatIsInclusiveGrowth20081230.pdf.  
8 Else Oyen, “The Politics of Poverty Reduction,” International Social Science Journal 51, no. 162 
(1999): 461.  
9 The World Bank, Prosperity for All/Ending Extreme Poverty, 5.  
10 “Data: World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Annual %),” accessed May 21, 2014, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data/views/reorts/chart.aspx. 
11 “Data: World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.25 a Day (PPP) (% of 
Population),” accessed May 21, 2014, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx.  
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This comparative analysis contributes to the academic study of what factors 
influence how economic prosperity affects a country. This study looks as to whether 
economic growth in the 21st century is circulating prosperity among society to include 
poor households and if such prosperity is sustainable.  
Economic growth positively impacts societal development, but will not sustain 
development alone; growth enhancing policies furthered by an effective government are 
essential. Government efforts that promote inclusive growth and shared prosperity 
include pro-poor policies and pro-employment policies. Variations in rural and urban 
employment, as well as demographics, affect how employment policies influence an 
economy. This comparative analysis of economic growth examines how, if at all, 
economic prosperity reaches the rural and urban labor force in Tanzania and Zambia, and 
what possible mechanisms may be in place to enhance or prevent such shared prosperity.  
Tanzania and Zambia share similar colonial histories, and relatively stable 
governance records. Neither are dependent upon oil revenues. However, Tanzania’s 
economic growth has resulted in poverty reduction while Zambia’s has not. An initial 
difference possibly underlying economic growth’s effect on development indicators in 
these countries may be their significant labor force variations. A large percentage of 
Tanzania’s population is peasant and self-sufficient farmers, while Zambia has a 
relatively large labor class. Beginning in the 1990s, Zambia implemented pro-growth 
strategies in the agricultural sector, but with disappointing results. Zambian urban areas 
have also experienced an increase in poverty levels due to manufacturing sector 
setbacks.12 What factors condition the effect that economic growth has on development? 
How do employment sector characteristics and policies affect growth and development in 
each of these countries?  
This thesis analyzes the relationship between economic growth through a 
comparative study of Tanzania and Zambia, two countries that share a number of similar 
political-economic characteristics yet experience different outcomes resulting from 
                                                 
12 Hans Lofgren, James Thurlow and Sherman Robinson, Prospects for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction in Zambia, 2001–2015 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2004), 
68, http://www.ifpri.org/publication/prospects-growth-and-poverty-reduction-zambia-2001-2015.  
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economic growth. Using the World Bank database, SSA was narrowed down to non-
resource rich, stable countries with above average economic growth (from 2000 to 
present). Those with consistently high economic growth (measured as a percent rise in 
GDP) were then evaluated according to their poverty growth or declines. While both 
Tanzania and Zambia have experienced significant economic growth in the 21st century, 
Tanzania has been able to translate that growth into poverty reduction while Zambia has 
not. A contextual picture of the two countries’ economic growth trajectories is provided, 
with an emphasis on understanding how specific policies and changes in their governance 
have affected growth, poverty reduction, inequality, and overall development.  
After considering each respective country’s economic growth and constraints, the 
effectiveness in translating that growth into development, as espoused through national 
poverty reduction strategies, is reviewed. Explanatory variables to be considered as 
factors that condition the relationship between growth and development include the 
political and social environment in the two countries, their regime types, colonial history, 
and prospects for stability. Overlapping economic variables, such as employment sector 
information and property rights are then evaluated for any correlation with changes in the 
economic growth rate. Growth is measured as the change over time in real GDP per 
capita, and additional development indicators are triangulated using World Bank and 
United Nations indicators, such as poverty rates and the Human Development Index. 
A comparative study of economic growth strategies is dependent upon high 
quality, consistent data. Recently, the quality of SSA economic statistics and GDP 
estimates have been questioned.13 In addition to national statistic offices producing 
inaccurate numbers that have resulted in international database inaccuracies, numbers are 
often not produced at all. Unclear methods for filling in data result in questionable size 
and growth rates of SSA economies.14 A study recently re-examined Tanzania’s and 
Zambia’s economic growth over a three decade period, in light of recently discovered 
                                                 
13 “African Argument,” African Arguments Blog, November 20, 2012, http://africanarguments.org.  
14 “Measuring African GDP,” December 2013, http://www.worldeconomics.com/Papers/Measuring 
%20African%20GDP_2c4addf3-b795-44f2-8d30-23b9e22f284e.paper.  
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incomplete GDP measures.15 An analysis of 21st century economic growth in Tanzania 
and Zambia in the context of re-baselined GDP may further illuminate effectiveness of 
government policies toward shared economic prosperity. 
What is the relationship between growth and development? The different effects 
economic growth have on human development, and especially that of poverty reduction, 
is examined in the succeeding three chapters. Chapter II defines economic growth and 
development, examines what specifically encourages each, as well as explores the 
relationship between growth and development. Chapter III details recent economic 
growth strategies and policies, and their effects in Tanzania. Chapter IV details recent 
economic growth strategies and policies, and their effects in Zambia. The final chapter 
(Chapter V) analytically compares growth in Tanzania with that of Zambia, and its 
effects on development efforts, such as poverty reduction.  
                                                 
15 Morten Jerven, Economic Growth and Measurement Reconsidered in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Zambia, 1965–1995, 1st ed. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
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II. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
To evaluate economic growth effectively, and the factors that condition the effect 
growth has on development, an understanding of the measurement of the economy, the 
definition of growth, and what specifically encourages economic growth is paramount. 
This understanding is coupled with the definition of development and the relationship 
between growth and development to evaluate effective policies for growth and 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
GDP is the internationally accepted measurement of the size of a nation’s 
economy. Measured in United States (U.S.) dollars, GDP accounts for the value of all 
goods and services produced in an economy.16 As specifically defined by the World 
Bank, “GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products.”17 GDP divided by the population results in GDP per capita, or 
the amount of goods and services available per individual. Accounting for domestic price 
inflation results in real GDP per capita.  
GDP is not, however, a perfect measure of a nation’s economy. For example, 
GDP does not include labor performed in the informal sector, such as household 
production, agricultural production for household consumption, or home childcare. 
Identifying a consistent and appropriate national market value for the numerous goods 
and services produced throughout a country also remains a challenge for GDP 
computation. It is particularly difficult in less advanced economies where rural area 
pricing may be significantly different from national pricing.18 GDP figures do not 
consider negative societal effects, such as pollution or deforestation. GDP measurements 
are also criticized for merely measuring market production, which does not necessarily 
                                                 
16 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 25.  
17 “Data: GDP (Current U.S.$),” accessed May 29, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. 
GDP.MKTP.CD.  
18 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 26.  
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account for economic well-being.19 Despite acknowledged constraints, real GDP per 
capita in U.S. dollars is the best measurement for comparative growth analysis. 
Understanding a nation’s economic growth also entails references to the size of its 
economy as related to other nations. The World Bank utilizes gross national income 
(GNI) per capita figures to classify countries throughout the world. GNI includes the 
value of goods and services produced by a nation’s citizens worldwide, and not produced 
solely within a nation’s boundaries as does GDP. For fiscal year 2015, the World Bank 
classifies as a low-income economy those countries whose GNI per capita was $1,045 or 
less in fiscal year 2013. According to this measurement, high-income economies had a 
GNI per capita of $12,746, and middle-income economies’ classification is between 
$1,045 and $12,746 GNI per capita.20 Terminology in reference to low and middle-
income countries, such as underdeveloped countries, less developed countries, or Third 
World countries has also evolved in favor of less disparaging terms, such as developing 
countries or emerging economies, which specifically refer to those with maturing 
financial markets.21 
Economic growth is a reflection of changes in per capita over time.22 It is an 
increase in the total amount of goods and services available. GDP and real GDP per 
capita are the agreed upon measures utilized by the United Nations (UN), the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as multilateral agencies and 
independent researchers used to measure economic growth and growth over time.23 
Economic growth is a function of human capital, physical capital, and total factor 
productivity (TFP). Growth, therefore, depends upon an increase in assets, such as 
capital, labor, or land, and an increase in asset productivity, which may be achieved 
                                                 
19 Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (France: Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 2008), 21, http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitousssi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf. 
20 “Data: Country and Lending Groups,” 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-
groups. 
21 Thomas A. Pugel, International Economics, 15th ed. (New York: NY: McGraw-Hill, 2012), 317.  
22 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 24. 
23 Ibid., 25. 
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through increasing efficiency or technological advancements. The relationship between 
these basic factors of production (capital and labor), and total economic production, 
underpin economic growth theories.24  
The causal factors contributing to economic growth are continually evaluated. 
Classical economic growth theories throughout the 19th and 20th century emphasized 
capital factors of production, such as land. In 1817, David Ricardo emphasized the 
human capital aspect of factor accumulation by focusing specifically on the comparative 
advantages of free trade and the iron law of wages.25 Fifty years later, Karl Marx also 
spoke of capital accumulation as growth’s driving force, detailed in Das Kapital. 
Necessary components for growth emphasized by classical theorists include capital 
accumulation through savings, in addition to free trade, and freedom from government 
intervention. Factor accumulation is a critical input for economic growth, the production 
of national output, but not sufficient to sustain growth.26 Neoclassical growth theorists, 
the prevailing school today, attribute economic growth to these same determinants, as 
well as to technological innovation.27  
The emphasis by classical and neoclassical theorists on capital accumulation is 
supported by the Solow growth model. This model, while highlighting the role 
investment plays in capital stock, emphasizes capital accumulation as the main source of 
growth for developing countries.28 Increases in production, accounted for in total factor 
productivity, become increasingly important, and capital accumulation less so, as national 
incomes rise and economies develop.29 The Solow growth model has important 
implications for developing countries. Given that low-income countries have the potential 
for rapid growth and that growth rates slow as incomes rise, the incomes of low-income 
                                                 
24 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 25. 
25 David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: 1817: Reprint 
Electric Book Co., 2001), E-book, 433, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Doc?id=2001615. 
26 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 87. 
27 Robert E. Looney, “Classical Theories of Growth and Development,” NS4053 Winter Term 2014 
PowerPoint (presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA).  
28 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 65, 73. 
29 Ibid., 74.  
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countries can potentially converge with those of high-income countries. The Solow 
model also demonstrates the necessity of new technology in accelerating and sustaining 
economic growth.30 Unlike the Solow model, endogenous growth models of the 1990s 
sought to explain the rate of technological advancement.31 These models, which 
emphasize innovation, human capital investments, and government policies, provide the 
basis for current economic growth scholarship.32  
At the turn of the 21st century, a specific, agreed upon set of universal rules for, 
or roadmap to, economic growth still did not exist. Although key functions needed to be 
fulfilled over time—including capital accumulation, the efficient allocation of resources, 
technological innovation, and the allocation of growth’s benefits—global economic 
policymakers accepted that the same policy may yield different results or different 
policies may yield the same results, depending upon a country’s institutions or growth 
strategies.33 Economic growth is context specific. A 2005 Harvard University study, 
“Growth Diagnostics,” noted that enforcing property rights, maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, integrating with the world economy, and creating a sound business environment 
resulted in varied effects throughout the world.34 The resulting policy prescription 
challenged each country to identify the most binding constraints and work toward their 
elimination, and thus focus on the economic environment one aspect at a time instead of 
attempting sets of reforms, which may result in weak, unintended, or negative effects.35 
Similar heterodox arguments support the role imperfect national institutions and a 
country’s specific economic environment play in shaping economic growth.  
                                                 
30 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 128. 
31 Ibid.  
32 The World Bank, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, 
(Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on behalf of The World 
Bank, 2008), 18, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6507/449860PUB0Box 
3101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?sequence=1.  
33 E. Wayne Nafziger, Economic Development, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 144.  
34 Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andres Velasco, “Getting the Diagnosis Right: A New 
Approach to Economic Reform,” International Monetary Fund Finance & Development 43, no. 1 (2006), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/03/hausmann.htm.  
35 Ibid.  
 11
China’s extraordinary economic growth epitomizes the benefits of following a 
context-driven economic path. From 1978–2005, China’s per capita GDP growth rate of 
8.5 percent was more than double the 4.1 percent per capita GDP growth rate of 1952–
1978.36 This growth produced the most sustained period of rapid economic growth in 
human history.37 While China’s growth was the product of increased accumulation of 
physical capital, labor, and human capital, as well as the opening of markets and 
increased competition,38 China also benefitted from institutions unique to its economic 
environment. Without complete liberalization, privatization, or democratization, China 
employed national institutions to its economic advantage. Market liberalization took the 
form of the dual-track approach with both a liberal price mechanism, as well as plan 
prices and quotas.39 Rural township-village enterprises opened the door to property rights 
and privatization, while anonymous banking limited government predation.40 China’s 
economic growth strategy followed the dictum set by Deng Xiaoping of “crossing the 
river by feeling for stones.”  
Economic growth is desired not for growth itself, but for the advantages it 
bestows upon society. The factor accumulation and productivity changes of economic 
growth do not sufficiently account for societal advancement, or economic development. 
Economic growth is a necessary, but not sufficient cause of economic development, 
which specifically comprises improvements in human welfare.41 Welfare advancements 
include improvements in education, health, science, finance, and government among 
others.42 Current economic scholarship supports the causal link of economic growth to 
development,43 even as the precise role of the state in securing and supporting that 
                                                 
36 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007), 140. 
37 Ibid., 143. 
38 Ibid., 7. 
39 Yingyi Qian, “How Reform Worked in China,” in In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on 
Economic Growth, ed. Dani Rodrik (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 306. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Perkins et al., Economics of Development, 14. 
42 The World Bank, The Growth Report, 18. 
43 Roemer and Gugerty, “Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?”  
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growth remains debated. Although economic growth supports development, and is a 
necessary cause for development, economic prosperity and high growth rates alone do 
not necessarily lead to development. For example, oil-rich nations in SSA witness 
dramatically high rates of growth with minimal societal development. Additionally, a 
2013 IMF study found that the previous 15 years of quality growth in SSA led to uneven 
progress in social indicators, such as poverty reduction, infant mortality, and education 
rates.44 No singular measurement of economic development is available. Various 
indicators or measurements of human development exist that attempt to quantify quality 
of life data, such as the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI). In populating 
the HDI, the United Nations’ Development Programme (UNDP) compiles development 
indicators reflecting education, health, and income data among other dimensions.45 As 
noted by the UNDP, the HDI was created to ensure that individuals and their capabilities, 
and not just economic advancement, are the true measurement of a country’s 
development.46 The HDI divides the world’s countries into four tiers based on a summary 
measure of development dimensions reflecting a long and healthy life, being 
knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living.47 
The millennium development goals (MDGs) also quantify societal advancement. 
The eight MDGs include halving extreme poverty rates, stopping the spread of malaria 
and other diseases, reducing child mortality, as well as achieving universal primary 
education.48 Indicator analyses are annually published in the United Nations’ Human 
Development Report. Similarly, the World Bank’s world development index (WDI) 
reports progress on the MDGs, as well as other statistics representing an analytical 
                                                 
44 Marcelo Martinez and Montfort Mlachila, The Quality of Recent High-Growth Episode in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The International Monetary Fund, 2013).  
45 Khalid Malik, Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South, Human Progress in a 
Diverse World (New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 2014), http://www.undp.org/ 
content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2013GlobalHDR/English/HDR2013 percent20Report percent 
20English.pdf.  
46 “Human Development Index, (HDI),” accessed December 6, 2014, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ 
human-development-index-hdi. 
47 Ibid. 
48 “Millennium Development Goals,” accessed May 4, 2014, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
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snapshot encompassing people, the environment, and the economy.49 Both the UN and 
the World Bank seek to monitor the quality of economic development. Such development 
is the result of inclusive growth in which economic prosperity is not retained in the hands 
of a nation’s few. Economic development entails increasing the skills and earning 
capacity of the population.  
The “dirigiste dogma” that was prevalent in the field of development economics 
in the 1960s asserted that states must actively support development through the 
economy.50 In “The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers,” 
Kiren Chaudhry argues for state intervention in pursuit of growth for late developing 
countries. Late developers have different institutional needs from other industrializing 
countries, which thus require state intervention.51 This interventionist perspective is 
countered by Deepak Lal, who believes state involvement will only harm self-regulating 
market forces.52  
Alexander Gerschenkron, in turn, speaks to the advantages technological 
innovation imparts to developing countries as capital accumulation is used to propel such 
countries forward in development and rapid industrialization.53 Gerschenkron’s 
“Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” counters Walt Whitman Rostow’s 
modernization theory approach, which presents a growth model based on a series of 
stages, like Marx, through which all countries progress.54 In “The Wealth and Poverty of 
Nations,” David Landes also argues that progression toward industrialization and 
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advancement is not inevitable. When progression and development do occur, Landes 
emphasizes the central role of the state.55 
SSA remains a developing region. The challenge will be to translate positive 
economic growth into inclusive growth, with corresponding societal development and 
subsequent poverty reduction. Successful development has been seen in some countries, 
reflected in declining poverty rates and childhood education attainment, but remains 
elusive for others. The quality and sustainability of the region’s economic growth is 
therefore questioned.  
Economic growth is not necessarily inclusive through all segments of society. For 
example, the young labor force is often excluded. A country’s youth is an essential 
demographic to tie into the workforce and ensure income producing employment is 
available.56 SSA has favorable demographics for strong economic growth as long as 
employment opportunities are provided.57 Yet, translating growth into employment 
income remains a regional challenge.58 Regardless of the economic prosperity, inequality 
will rise if the poor’s income per capita remains unchanged. In turn, inequality also 
affects poverty’s responsiveness to growth, with poverty incidence possibly unresponsive 
to growth in the highest inequality countries.59  
National development policies may, at worst, conflict with individual pro-poor 
policies, and at best, remain complex and not well understood. Economic growth is not 
only necessary for development, but it is also dependent upon the development of human 
capital, such as health and education. Such investments in human capital will enable the 
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poor to transition from the informal sector to formal sector employment. The World Bank 
recommends that governments promote inclusive growth by allocating resources through 
conditional or direct cash transfers.60 Distributional policies from economic growth 
remain challenging politically as surpluses are distributed among technological 
advancements or pro-poor human capital investments.  
The inclusive growth currently seen in some SSA countries has been attributed to 
various factors. Government policies that encourage agricultural productivity, address the 
geography of impoverished areas, and improve market efficiencies effectively are shown 
to reduce poverty and encourage pro-poor growth.61 In Emerging Africa: How 17 
Countries Are Leading the Way, Steven Radelet attributes recent advancements in 
poverty reduction and other HDI indices to recent fundamental changes in government 
accountability and technology, improved economic policies and management, and the 
emergence of development-oriented leaders in the public and private sectors.62 Current 
scholarship echoes the support for these internal growth drivers. Thandika Mkandawire, 
of the London School of Economics, identified the following items for sustained growth, 
“…improved and prudent mobilization of human, material, and financial capital, which 
entails making the most of the continent’s vast resources through increased technological 
mastery in order to achieve socially inclusive (and therefore politically sustainable) 
growth.”63  
Tanzania and Zambia share a number of similar political-economic characteristics 
yet experience different developmental outcomes resulting from economic growth.  A 
contextual picture of the two countries’ economic growth trajectories highlights how 
specific policies and changes in their governance have affected growth, overall 
development, and poverty reduction.  
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III. ECONOMIC POLICIES OF TANZANIA: FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Tanzania’s transition to a market-based economy at the end of the 20th century 
halted the country’s economic descent, characteristic of much of the developing world 
during the 1980s due to the global increase in oil prices, declining agricultural export 
prices, and increasing public debt.64 Successive market reforms not only recused the 
Tanzanian economy from relative stagnation, but also laid the foundation for significant 
economic growth. The country’s current socio-economic policy guidance, Development 
Vision 2025, embraces policy reform, which thus encourages Tanzania’s continued 
growth toward its goal of becoming a middle-income country, while maintaining a 
consistent focus on development. This chapter begins with a brief overview of Tanzania’s 
political economic trajectory, beginning with the country’s independence, and progresses 
through a focused analysis of national reforms, successive poverty reduction strategies, 
and subsequent outcomes.  
Beginning in 1967, Tanzania’s economy was controlled by the state. The 
exchange rate and pricing decisions were influenced by non-market mechanisms. Fiscal 
and monetary policies were expansionary and external economic shocks, such as 
droughts and terms of trade, were not adequately addressed. Over the next three decades, 
economic reforms liberalized trade and the agricultural marketing system, in addition to 
domestic prices, as well as reformed the financial system and parastatals. Tanzania’s 
foreign exchange reserves were subsequently restored in the 1990s through liberalized 
imports and the free trade of the private sector. By the new millennium, Tanzania’s 
economy consisted of privatized parastatals, a liberalized financial sector, and extensive 
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trade reform, which included regional cooperation. Tanzania’s economy is also currently 
influenced by a significant amount of financial assistance.65  
Formerly a German colony and British protectorate, the United Republic of 
Tanzania (comprising the Zanzibar archipelago and the mainland, formerly known as 
Tanganyika) was united in 1964 under President Julius Nyerere, and has enjoyed political 
stability for the past 40 years.66 The Zanzibar archipelago, consisting of Zanzibar, the 
Pemba islands and a number of smaller islands, is semi-autonomous with its own 
president and parliament. Roughly one and a half times the size of Texas (947 thousand 
sq. km.), Tanzania currently has a population of almost 51 million (in 2014) consisting of 
125 various ethnic groups.67  
Under President Nyerere, Tanzania was a one-party state with centralized 
economic management. Upon unification, the rural-focused development strategy, 
Ujamaa, was a collective village-based movement of socialism centered on the 
communist society model of self-reliance, freedom, and familyhood.68 Nyerere’s socialist 
persuasion codified in the 1967 Arusha Declaration guided Tanzania’s economic and 
development policies, such as the nationalization of commercial banks and industry.69 
The state controlled the economy and all major enterprises, or “commanding heights.” 
The Arusha Declaration proved ultimately unsuccessful in creating a robust and self-
sustaining economy. From 1967–1980, rising inflation, a decline in both producer prices 
and agricultural output, transport deterioration due to the high cost of oil, and high 
urbanization rates of 10 percent a year, characterized Tanzania’s weak economic 
position.70 Unprofitable public enterprises and budget deficits were financed by printing 
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more money.71 Economic decline culminated in the 1980 economic crisis, exemplified by 
annual inflation rates above 30 percent and Tanzania’s inability to service its foreign 
debt.72 Economic paralysis led Tanzania to embrace adjustment programs of 
liberalization and privatization, as well as socio-economic reforms.  
With the onset of the 21st century, the Tanzanian government embraced economic 
policies to promote economic growth and advance the country’s participation in the 
global economy, underscored by the Tanzania Development Vision 2025. Successive 
multi-year economic policies, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), have guided 
Tanzania’s economy with growth and development prescriptions intended to further 
economic growth and enhance the quality of life for its citizens, to develop the country’s 
weak infrastructure system, and to encourage a robust private sector economy.73 
Tanzania’s economic policies have pursued growth in human capital, physical capital, 
and TFP) with varying emphasis. The country’s most significant growth constraints have 
been weak infrastructure and insufficient participation in the global economy. Successive 
PRSPs have attempted to address these constraints while simultaneously positively 
affecting the quality development of its citizenry.  
Although work still needs to be done, Tanzania has made significant progress in 
creating an effective environment for sustained economic growth, which has resulted in 
improved quality of life for its population. Tanzania’s overall economic trajectory has 
outperformed SSA in real GDP growth percentage, as well as inflation percentage. GDP 
per capita, however, has not kept pace with SSA (see Figure 1). Societal advancement 
has also progressed. Tanzania ranked 160th out of 187 countries in the United Nations 
Development Programme’s 2014 HDI.74 Although still in the lowest human development 
tier along with 42 other countries, such as Ethiopia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, Tanzania’s 
ranking has continuously improved in recent decades. Average annual HDI growth 
improved from 1980–1990, 1990–2000, and 2000–2013 from -0.64, to 0.59, and 2.04, 
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respectively.75 The challenge remains the continuous and effective transformation of 
sustained economic growth into socio-economic development. 
 
Figure 1.  Tanzania and Sub-Saharan Africa Macroeconomic Performance, 
1970–200876 
B. THE TURN TO THE MARKET 
While Ujamaa socialism helped to politically unify a post-independence nation, it 
was accompanied by economic decline.77 Twenty villages studied in 1980 occupied 8 
percent of the land, while taking 20 percent of the local labor force, and producing only 2 
percent of agricultural output.78 As noted by IMF, “Widespread state ownership and 
intervention undermined economic performance. Low centrally determined prices and 
inefficient public marketing boards caused a sharp decline in agricultural production, 
particularly of export crops.”79 Critical reforms were necessary to transform Tanzania’s 
ineffective state-managed economy into a prosperous system. Ujamaa was abandoned 
amid the economic instability, which culminated with President Nyerere’s retirement in 
75 “Data: World Development Indicators: Tanzania.” 
76 Nord et al., Tanzania: The Story of an African Transition, 2. 
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1985. With Nyerere stepping down, the former president of Zanzibar, Ali Mwinyi, was 
elected to the presidency and began market reforms.80 Initial reforms included the 
removal of price, production, and marketing controls, the unification of the exchange 
rate, and the liberalization of foreign trade. 
Tanzania’s transition to a market economy began with the 1986 economic 
recovery program (ERP). Specific policies included opening the marketing and food crop 
distribution to the private sector, as well as lifting the monopolies of export crops held by 
marketing boards.81 By the early 1980s, over 400 categories of products had price 
controls that were consequently eroding official producer prices for export crops by up to 
50 percent.82 As the economy slowly liberalized, food producers were no longer forced to 
sell their export crops to parastatals at uncompetitive prices. The import and export 
licensing systems, formerly regulated through individual government ministries, were 
now subject to a market-pricing system also.  
Tanzania’s reform efforts also liberalized foreign trade that were augmented by 
regional trade policies. The 1986 ERP addressed exchange rate reforms. The premium 
between the market and official exchange rates increased from roughly 100 percent in the 
1970s to roughly 250 percent between 1980 and 1985. Prior to the adoption of a crawling 
peg exchange rate regime in 1986, the differential was as high as 750 percent. Exchange 
rate reforms also included the introduction of exchange rate bureaus in 1992, which 
bought and sold foreign exchange at freely negotiated rates. Also, beginning in 1992, the 
government allowed international companies to import and distribute agricultural inputs, 
and therefore, withdraw from marketing and distribution. The Crop Boards Act of 1993 
permitted private sector entry into the marketing and processing of agricultural exports, 
which were traditionally a marketing board monopoly. The elimination of market and 
policy distortions, as well as regular exchange rate adjustments, resulted in appropriate 
price signals received through international competition.83  
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Successive policies implemented to encourage export production, as well as ease 
import restrictions, included approving a greater number of import licenses, which 
evolved to eventually eliminating the need for import licenses all together. An export 
retention scheme was also implemented, which allowed exporters to retain a greater 
amount of their foreign exchange earnings. Although most trade restrictions had been 
eliminated by 1993, as a signatory of the 1993 Cross-Border Initiative, adopted by 14 
African countries, Tanzania had eliminated all trade restrictions by 2000.84 
Parastatal reforms complemented the country’s entry into the open-market. 
Tanzania’s early nationalization policies resulted in approximately 400 parastatals by 
1988, which controlled most sectors of the economy to include finance, manufacturing 
and agricultural marketing, and distribution. These nationalized industries accounted for 
20 percent of GDP in 1988. As noted by the IMF, the government’s financial difficulties 
resulted in the inability of most firms to cover their operating costs, which subsequently 
rendered them unable to service their commercial debt. Beginning with the 1992 Public 
Corporations Act, Tanzania began divesting the state of parastatal enterprises. A decade 
later, industries regulating most basic consumer goods had been privatized or liquidated, 
if not financially viable. This effort included the nation’s telecommunications industry 
and its international container terminal.85  
As the result of specific policy reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Tanzania secured its faltering economy and laid the groundwork for future economic 
success. These initial market liberalizing reforms eased the constraints individuals and 
industries had been operating under, which thereby immediately introduced market 
efficiencies into the national economy and igniting growth. However, as underscored by 
Dani Rodrik, a distinction exists between igniting economic growth in the short term and 
sustaining such growth over the medium and long term. For sustained growth to 
encourage improvements in human welfare, such as poverty reduction, Tanzania would 
have to develop inclusive growth policies and a supportive institutional framework in 
addition to removing historical barriers to growth. The recognized absence of a current 
                                                 
84 Nord et al., Tanzania: The Story of an African Transition, 12–13.  
85 Ibid., 18–19.  
 23
doctrine to guide national policy resulted in Development Vision 2025, which thus 
articulated Tanzania’s desire to maximize its full participation in the global economy 
while advancing national development.  
C. TANZANIA DEVELOPMENT VISION 2025 
Written in 1995 by Tanzania’s Planning Commission, Tanzania Development 
Vision 2025 (Vision 2025) provides guidance for the country’s economic and social 
development policies. As noted in Vision 2025, the economic growth strategies of the 
Arusha Declaration were based on state-control of the means of production and an 
assumed growth in the public sector.86 The Planning Commission acknowledged the 
country’s national unity, social cohesion, stability, and peace resulting from the 
Declaration’s emphasis on fundamental moral and civil values.87 However, the 
successive five-year plans of the 1960s and ‘70s, following the framework of the Arusha 
Declaration, did not recognize the limitations of centrally planned public-sector-led 
development and administration.88  
In the early 1990s, Tanzania was just beginning to recover economically. Specific 
impediments to earlier reform efforts were identified as a donor dependency syndrome 
and a defeatist developmental mindset, a weak and low capacity for economic 
management, failures in good governance and in the organization of production, and 
ineffective implementation syndrome.89 Acknowledging failed social and economic 
reforms not informed by a national long-term development philosophy and direction, 
Tanzanian President Benjamin W. Mkapa called Vision 2025, “a vehicle of hope and an 
inspiration for motivating people to search and work harder for the betterment of the 
livelihood and posterity.”90 With this guidance, the government envisions the country 
progressing from a least developed country to a middle-income country by 2025, with a 
                                                 
86 United Republic of Tanzania, The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (Dodoma: The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 1995), 6, http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/theTanzaniadevelopmentvision.pdf. 
87 Ibid., 6–7.  
88 Ibid., 15.  
89 Ibid., 7–8.  
90 Ibid., 2.  
 24
correspondingly high level of human development, as well as transforming a low 
productivity agricultural economy into a semi-industrialized one.91 
As outlined in its introduction, the three principal objectives of Vision 2025 are, 
“achieving quality and good life for all; good governance and the rule of law; and 
building a strong and resilient economy that can effectively withstand global 
competition.”92 Vision 2025 established broad economic and governance policy goals for 
the country, through which then President Mkapa sought to “disentangle ourselves from 
the scourge of poverty.”93 It lays out the framework to develop a strong, diversified, and 
competitive economy, which can effectively cope with the challenges of development, as 
well as adapt to the changing market and global economy.94  
Tanzania is a primarily agricultural economy. While the agricultural sector as a 
percent of value added to GDP declined from 46 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2013,95 
an estimated 80 percent of the working population is currently engaged in agricultural 
activity.96 This sector comprises approximately one quarter of the country’s GDP, which 
employs approximately three quarters of all workers.97 Subsistence farming is common 
in rural areas. Approximately 10 percent of Tanzania’s arable land is cultivated, with 
approximately 10 percent of this land equipped for irrigation.98 Unfavorable weather 
conditions, such as droughts, significantly impact this sector, and consequently, the 
economy. The Tanzanian government recognizes the vulnerability in this physical capital 
and the corresponding need to insulate the economy against such fluctuations. Successive 
economic strategies have focused on this weakness, but without significant improvements 
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in the nation’s infrastructure, Tanzania will remain vulnerable to external economic 
shocks caused by unfavorable weather conditions.  
Sustained economic growth is impossible without underlying macroeconomic 
stability. Tanzanian policymakers recognize the need for a sound macroeconomic 
environment in which to transform the agricultural economy into a global, market 
competitor. In seeking to get the macroeconomic fundamentals right, the government 
acknowledges the role of attaining high levels of domestic savings, promoting price 
stability, and reducing Tanzania’s reliance on external financial support.99 Official 
development assistance (ODA) was 20.5 percent of GNI in 1988 that rose to 28.6 percent 
by 1990.100 Concurrently, the government aims to modernize its agricultural sector, 
which is dependent on rainfall and outdated technology, both of which contribute to low 
and erratic productivity.101 A modernized rural sector is envisioned to result in increased 
agricultural productivity that would lead to rising incomes, food security, and self-
sufficiency.102 
The strength of Development Vision 2025 relies on its understanding of the co-
dependent relationship between societal development and an economy’s capacity to 
encourage a higher standard of living through economic growth. The Planning 
Commission noted the high quality of life enjoyed in Tanzania until the mid-1970s, due 
to a strong economy with annual growth rates of 5–6 percent and a low inflation rate. 
Economic instability and subsequent stagnation stalled development and lowered the 
quality of life for most Tanzanians. The Commission calls upon the country’s leadership, 
which is “expected to identify the appropriate policies and strategies” to enable a resilient 
economy and development, which accompanies economic growth.103  
Vision 2025 also contains weaknesses; the assumptions that underlay the Vision 
are significant. To achieve the outlined goals, the Planning Commission expects the 
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Tanzanian economy to be diversified and semi-industrialized, enhanced with 
macroeconomic stability and to grow at a rate of 8 percent or more a year, with low levels 
of inflation.104 These growth expectations contrast significantly with the stagnated 
economy of the 1960s and ‘70s. Without considerable infrastructure improvement, such 
as reliable electricity, Tanzania will not develop into a semi-industrialized country. 
Perhaps most notable, while inflation has steadily decreased since 1995, the economy’s 






Figure 2.  Inflation, Consumer 
Prices (Annual %)105 
Figure 3.  Tanzania GDP Growth 
(Annual %)106 
The economically liberalizing policies and turn to the market undertaken by 
Tanzania in the 1980s righted the struggling economy. Successive PRSPs have 
endeavored to capitalize on that progress, as the country works toward the objectives 
presented in Vision 2025 and ensuring the equal distribution of economic growth’s 
benefits.  
D. THE INITIAL EFFECTS OF REFORM 
By 2000, market-enhancing policies were producing tangible economic results. 
Privatized parastatals, a liberalizing financial sector, trade reform, and regional trade 
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cooperation in addition to financial assistance from the international community resulted 
in an improving GDP and declining inflation. However, continued economic reforms 
were required to ensure continued growth and that the population shared in the benefits of 
that growth. 
Improving market conditions were not permeating all aspects of society. The 
percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 per day rose from 29.2 percent in 
1992 to 41.2 percent in 2000 (poverty gap at $1.25 a day PPP percent).107 By 2000, the 
incidence of poverty, while having declined for the decade between 1983 and 1993, was 
again increasing, attributable to relatively low economic growth and worsening income 
inequality, especially in rural areas.108 While access to electricity did improve slightly for 
the rural populace from 1.3 percent in 1990 to 1.7 percent in 2000, the primary education 
net enrollment rate dropped from a high of 70 percent in 1980 to an average of 50 percent 
in the 1990s.109 
Tanzania’s rural areas account for the majority of the country’s poor. In 1993, the 
World Bank found that 50 percent of all Tanzanians lived below the relative poverty 
line.110 Of these, 88 percent lived in rural areas.111 Tanzania’s 1991/92 household budget 
survey (HBS) reported that the basic needs rural poverty incidence was 57 percent,112 
while the poverty incidence was 29 percent for the urban population.113 The rural poor 
are predominantly farmers, who, if they own land at all, use basic technologies like hand 
hoes to work their land.114 A 2007 World Bank paper noted that the agriculture sector 
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had the largest impact on employment, followed by building and construction, and then 
by the manufacturing sector.115 Using a static multiplier analysis, the agriculture sector 
had the biggest multiplier from a poverty reduction perspective.116  
Tanzania’s income inequality began increasing in 1990. While successfully 
igniting economic growth, initial market liberalizing reforms negatively affected 
Tanzania’s disenfranchised. After an initial decline from 1980–1990, the country’s 
income inequality rose to a Gini coefficient deviation of .37 in 2000, on par with 1980 
levels of income distribution.117 As cited in a 1996 International Labour Office (ILO) 
report, economic reforms resulted in the diversification of income sources for rural 
incomes.118 As reforms benefitted those with employment skills or capital, unskilled 
workers faced increased competition for employment, and were forced to accept lower 
wages or unemployment. Economic growth encouraged by neoliberal reforms will 
succeed in promoting human capital and overall development only through inclusive 
growth policies; inequality will continue to rise if the poor’s income per capita remains 
unchanged. A program of successive PRSPs aspired to promote inclusive policies and 
ensure economic advancements coincided with growth in human capital.  
E. POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS: 2000, 2006, AND 2010 
National strategies for the growth of the Tanzanian economy were informed by 
Vision 2025. PRSPs are the vehicle for attaining the objectives of Vision 2025, a good 
and quality life for all, good governance and the rule of law, and a strong and resilient 
economy. PRSPs written by the Tanzanian government in consultation with international 
stakeholders, such as the World Bank and the IMF, seek to put in place the economic 
policies required to accomplish the goals of Vision 2025. They detail the macroeconomic, 
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structural, and social policies in support of economic growth and poverty reduction.119 
PRSPs identify the country’s planned increases in capital, labor, and asset productivity, 
and detail growth strategies that affect the country’s economic growth trajectory 
positively.  
The PRSP process is not without criticism. For example,  
Despite the rhetoric of participation, empowerment and ownership that 
infuses the discourse on PRSPs, these are nevertheless fundamentally 
rather centralized processes following blueprints available on World Bank 
and IMF websites, and connected to central budget support and public 
expenditure management considerations that are to do with improving 
governance at high government levels.120  
Concluding indicators resulting from PRSPs and their macro strategic policies often fail 
fully to consider the complicated relationships of cause and effect that result in specific 
outcomes.121 While micro level research ensures developed policies are indeed 
comprehensive and pertain to as much of society as possible, PRSPs are an essential first 
step in economic policy formulation in support of the national development strategy. 
PRSPs have also been shown to “create space for policy dialogue” and streamline 
poverty reduction efforts.122 Tanzania’s October 2000 PRSP sought to rectify the 
apparent inconsistencies of inceptive market liberalization policies through which shared 
prosperity remained elusive.  
Plagued by inconsistent methods, definitions, and samples, by the new 
millennium, Tanzania required a more focused approach to poverty reduction. To solve 
the problem, Tanzania first needed to be able to define it consistently. The 2000 PRSP 
defined poverty in terms of “income” and “non-income” human development attributes. 
Income poverty primarily concentrates in Tanzania’s rural areas among farmers engaged 
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in subsistence agriculture. However, at the turn of the century, income poverty was 
increasing in urban areas, where, as the PRSP noted, “the urban poor are concentrated in 
the informal sector.”123 Non-income poverty indicators include education availability and 
attainment, infant mortality rates, nutrition, and access to clean and safe drinking water 
among others.124 Acknowledging the correlation between equitable economic growth and 
poverty reduction, the PRSP targeted accelerated GDP growth, as well as an increase in 
the real value-added of agriculture, in addition to anticipated industrial and service sector 
growth. The Tanzanian government believed these targets to be achievable against the 
backdrop of a stable, macroeconomic environment, and continuing structural reforms.125  
To counter the nation’s poverty effectively, Tanzania required a more 
comprehensive understanding of its current situation. The government, therefore, 
introduced several initiatives to account for the nation’s impoverished better and to 
improve its poverty database. Initiatives included an HBS to replace the 1991/2 survey, a 
labor survey, and a population and housing census.126 The 2000/1 HBS would account 
for 15,000 households, as compared with the 1991/2 survey, which covered 
approximately 5,300 households.  
The 2000 PRSP set long-term and medium-term targets and outcome indicators, 
as well as intermediate indicators. This framework was divided into three main areas: 
reduced income poverty, improve quality of life and social well-being, and achieve and 
sustain a conducive development environment, with specific targets listed within each 
main area. A number of the specific objectives detailed in the 2000 PRSP were achieved. 
The infant mortality rate was reduced to 66 per 1,000 births by 2003, which surpassed the 
goal of 85 per 1,000 births. Infant mortality was further reduced to 57 per 1,000 births by 
2005.127 Reductions were also seen in the under-five mortality rate and in the incidence 
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of maternal mortality.128 The lifetime expectancy goal of 52 years by 2010 was met in 
2003, and increased to 54 years in 2005.129 Similar success was achieved in net primary 
school enrollment, which reached 91 percent in 2005.130  
Although specific targets of the 2000 PRSP were met by 2005, income poverty in 
Tanzania remained high. The 2000/1 HBS reported that 18.7 percent of the population 
lived below the food poverty line, while 35.7 percent of the population lived below the 
national basic needs poverty line. Although these figures showed a slight improvement 
from the 1991/2 HBS (21.6 and 38.6 percent, respectively), population growth and the 
coinciding increasing absolute number of the poor caused the government concern.131 
Not only did income poverty remain high after the 2000 PRSP, but the rural poor were 
shown to have become increasingly disenfranchised from the political decision-making 
process that was dominated by the private sector and the government.132 Institutional 
reforms and the management of public services were emphasized as essential aspects of 
the PRSP process.133 
Tanzania’s second PRSP was completed in 2005 and released in 2006. Commonly 
referred to by its Kiswahili acronym MKUKUTA, the National Strategy for Growth and 
the Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), echoed Vision 2025’s emphasis of accelerating 
private-sector led growth through the development of a competitive economy.134 It was 
specifically, “informed by the aspirations of Tanzania’s Development Vision (Vision 25) 
for high and shared growth, high quality livelihood, peace, stability and unity, good 
governance, high quality education and international competitiveness.”135 Goals, 
operational targets, and strategies for attainment supported these common targets. The 
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MKUKUTA also detailed areas for improvement. In evaluating physical capital 
advances, such as key infrastructure investments, the paper cited deficiencies in the 
previous planning framework, the lack of growth strategy clarity, and the need for better 
coordination.136  
Referring to the 2000 PRSP as a “priority sector spending approach,” the 2006 
PRSP claimed an “outcomes-based” approach that “stresses inter-sector linkages and 
synergies and encourages cross-sector collaboration...also emphasizes the need to 
institutionalize participation and better mainstreaming cross-cutting issues.”137 Inter-
sector linkages are found throughout the country as different entities from the public and 
private sectors were called upon to work with each other and various communities in 
support of MKUKUTA objectives.  
The MKUKUTA reaffirmed the importance of macroeconomic stability as 
Tanzania sought to accelerate economic growth while keeping inflation low. It outlined 
the efficient use of public resources, the effective management of liquidity pressures from 
extensive economic assistance, and the promotion of private sector economic growth.138 
Echoing Vision 2025, the three cluster goals outlined in the strategy were economic 
growth and the reduction of income poverty, the improvement of Tanzanians’ quality of 
life and social well-being, and good governance and accountability. Assumptions 
underpinning these goals included real GDP average growth rate of 6–8 percent per year 
between 2005 and 2010, the continued pursuit of debt relief under the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund’s heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) relief initiative, 
and assumed improvements in agricultural productivity and economic service sectors.139  
Whereas the MKUKUTA and the 2000 PRSP both emphasized areas of human 
capital, such as poverty reduction, the MKUKUTA also focused heavily on service 
delivery. PRSP criticism highlighted the historical under-representation of the rural and 
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agricultural sectors, sectors for which service-delivery is crucial.140 This criticism echoed 
a World Bank/IMF finding that the 2000 PRSP engaged a wide variety of stakeholders, 
which resulted in formulations that tended to be broad, rather than deep.141 The 
MKUKUTA sought to correct this discrepancy through an enhanced focus on societal 
inequalities. 
The strategy referred to the reversal of the often negative growth trends 
experienced in the 1980s, and noted that the 1990s did not offer a corresponding 
reduction in the incidence of poverty, which cited rural-urban and inter-and-intra regional 
disparities in income poverty and service delivery.142 The government was aware of the 
uneven benefits initial market liberalizing reforms had on Tanzania’s poor. Consequently, 
a specific focus of the MKUKUTA was infrastructure improvement and an enhanced 
environment for private sector-led growth.143 In addition to improvements, such as roads, 
the availability of electricity and water, this strategy cited, “increasing agricultural labor 
productivity through commercialization and value addition” as the key to rural poverty 
reduction, coupled with the development of the informal non-farm sector.144 The 
Tanzanian government also acknowledged that with an expected population growth 
increase of up to five million people by 2010 that thus brings 48 percent of the population 
into dependence age groups requiring either schooling or elderly health care, public 
service delivery improvements were required just to maintain the status quo.145 
The 2006 PRSP revised the country’s socio-economic development plans. To 
reduce rural area income poverty, the paper targeted both the population figure below the 
basic needs poverty line, as well as that below the food poverty line. Outlined strategies 
included providing reliable and affordable energy, enhancing life skills, increasing access 
to rural micro-financial services, as well as promoting community-based savings and 
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credit programs.146 To improve food availability and accessibility, the strategy prescribed 
an increased production of food-crops with adequate reserves to minimize vulnerability 
during shocks. This security resulted in a prescription of increased food crop production 
from the 9 million tons produced in 2003 to 12 million tons to be produced in 2010, and 
the maintenance of the national strategic grain reserve of at least four months of the 
national food requirement.147  
Significant constraints challenged the MKUKUTA’s successful implementation. 
In addition to the lack of resources, Tanzania faces absorptive constraints. As noted by 
the World Bank in 2007, Tanzania lacks trained manpower to include a qualified public 
administration and the manpower capacity to execute an expenditure program. It also 
lacks a qualified institutional framework at the sectoral level. The public sector 
absorptive capacity is also constrained as exemplified by the lack of qualified nurses, 
teachers, and road engineers, among others.148  
Policies toward Vision 2025’s objective of a strong and resilient economy 
continued to mature. Structural reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s continued in 
the new millennium. Ongoing reforms included the liberalization of the financial sector, 
parastatal sector reform, the liberalization of trade policies and institutions, as well as 
infrastructure improvements. Specifically, the government divested itself of 169 
companies by mid-2004, while 47 remained with government involvement. 
Telecommunications improvements included initiatives to develop communication 
centers for the benefit of rural areas, as well as the promotion of e-commerce.149  
By 2010, the Tanzanian economy showed signs of continued growth. From 2005–
2010, the annual GDP growth rate was 7 percent per year, except for the 6 percent growth 
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rate in 2009 owing to the global financial crisis, while inflation continued to decline.150 
GDP per capita steadily increased from $375 (as measured in constant U.S. dollars) in 
2005 to $452 in 2010 (see Figure 4).151 However, the 2010 PRSP, published against this 
backdrop of improved economic activity, offered caution. Although the incidence of 
poverty (poverty head count index) declined as measured in rural areas, urban areas, and 
mainland Tanzania, the decreases were disappointing given such a sustained economic 
growth rate.152 
 
Figure 4.  GDP per Capita (Current U.S.$)153 
The 2010 PRSP, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
(NSGRP II), like the previous NSGRP, also focuses on achieving the goals outlined in 
Vision 2025. Referred to as MKUKUTA II, focus areas include accelerated economic 
growth, the reduction of poverty, improved standard of living, as well as good 
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governance and accountability.154 Three clusters were again utilized to organize the 
Vision 2025 goals and the MDGs. The clusters are growth for the reduction of income 
poverty, improvements of quality of life and social well-being, and governance and 
accountability. MKUKUTA II aims to encourage economic growth and poverty reduction 
by advancing pro-poor growth strategies, which include increased investments in people 
and infrastructure development, as well as increased private sector participation in 
economic growth.155 
This second national growth strategy specifically emphasizes the creation of 
employment opportunities. Faulting NSGRP I for not translating economic growth into 
job creation, MKUKUTA II emphasizes the private sector in economic growth and 
employment generation through a strengthened business climate, efficient use of the 
factors of production, and infrastructure development.156 MKUKUTA II emphasizes the 
creation of employment opportunities, especially for the country’s women and youth. 
This focus highlights MKUKUTA II’s commitment to the development of human capital, 
even more so than previous PRSPs. In reflecting upon the country’s economic 
performance from 2005–2009, MKUKUTA II noted that the macroeconomic position of 
the country had deteriorated. Tanzania’s inflation rate, 5 percent in 2000, had risen to 
12.1 percent by 2009. The country’s import bill and production costs increased as the 
result of food shortages from drought, electricity outages, and an increase in fuel costs. 
The import bill was also negatively affected by fluctuating exchange rates. The import 
bill’s expansion outpaced export earnings, which resulted in trade deficit increases.157 
Tanzania’s economic position, like the rest of the global economy, was negatively 
affected by the global economic downturn, which began in 2008. The crisis resulted in a 
decrease in foreign direct investment (FDI) and a reduced demand for Tanzania’s 
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exports.158 However, Tanzania’s GDP has since increased and averages between 6 and 7 
percent. Continued growth has been attributed to advances in the telecommunications 
industry and the financial sector, in addition to construction and mining sector growth.159  
MKUKUTA II’s poverty reduction cluster echoes the desired poverty reduction 
outcomes of the first MKUKUTA, with renewed focus on inclusive and accelerated 
growth achievable through sound economic management. To achieve the desired 
outcomes, economic goals include an inflation rate below 5 percent, and the maintenance 
of at least six months of national reserves. Operational targets include an accelerated 
GDP growth rate of 8–10 percent, and economic growth in various sectors of the 
economy including manufacturing, mining, tourism, as well as agricultural.160 
MKUKUTA II’s economic goals are ambitious. The inflation rate and GDP growth rate 
goals have not been historically achievable for Tanzania. Although as Tanzania’s 
macroeconomic footing remains stable, the challenge for the government is to ensure the 
advantages of that growth are translated to all sectors of society through shared growth 
and improvements in human welfare. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In the past 30 years, Tanzania has experienced a radical turnaround in its 
economy. Structural reforms undertaken in the 1980s and ‘90s shifted the composition 
and effectiveness of government spending toward priority areas, such as education, 
health, and infrastructure.161 (See Figure 5)  
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Figure 5.  Tanzania: Priority Spending (Share of Total Spending Percent)162 
However, despite sustained economic growth and prioritized spending, significant 
corresponding development advances have not been made in Tanzania. Despite a 
prolonged period of macroeconomic stability, structural weaknesses in the economy, such 
as a continued dependency on developmental aid and the agricultural sector in addition to 
limited export trade, hamper socio-economic advances.163 
Tanzania remains classified as a low-income country. It currently ranks 160th out 
of 187 countries on the 2014 HDI, which places it among 41 other countries categorized 
with having “low human development.” From 2000–2013, however, Tanzania has shown 
an average 2 percent annual growth in HDI rankings.164 Varying methods of quantifying 
the nation’s poor in addition to population growth temper the apparent improvements 
made in the last decade. The poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (poverty gap at $1.25 
a day PPP percent) reflects dramatic improvements from 84.2 percent in 2000 to 67.9 
percent in 2007, and 43.5 percent in 2012.165 Available data from official governmental 
surveys likewise indicate a reduction in the number of people living below the national 
poverty line from 38.6 percent in 1991, to 33.4 percent in 2007, and 28.2 percent in 
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2012.166 However, the World Bank cautions that such improvements are, “not directly 
comparable, due to changes in survey methodologies and tools.”167 The number of 
Tanzanians living in poverty, 12 million, remains unchanged from 2001 due to 
population growth.168  
Economic growth is dependent upon growth in human capital. Societal 
development indicators continue to show improvements in Tanzania, although not on 
pace with the 21st century economy. The percentage of children enrolled in primary 
education has improved from just over 50 percent in 2000 to 98 percent in 2008.169 
Access to electricity has more than doubled since 1990, but as of 2010, it still only 
accounted for 15 percent of the population.170 Although the number of people living 
below the national poverty line has improved, 12 million Tanzanians continue to live in 
poverty. Of the urban area populations, 79 percent reported usually having three meals a 
day, as compared to only half the population in rural areas.171 While Tanzania has 
succeeded in achieving the Vision 2025 goal of building a strong and resilient economy, 
the challenge remains to achieve the primary goal of a quality and good life for all. 
In 2013, the President of Tanzania announced the implementation of the Big 
Results Now (BRN) development framework. This initiative uses public expenditures to 
address ongoing deficiencies in human and physical capital. Based upon Malaysia’s Big 
Fast Results Initiative, BRN is a comprehensive system designed to hasten the growth of 
six prioritized economic sectors: energy and natural gas, agriculture, water, education, 
transportation, and resource mobilization. Tanzania’s economy, like Malaysia’s, is 
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strongly influenced by agriculture and mining; Tanzania hopes to follow Malaysia’s 
growth strategy into development and industrialization.172  
Tanzania’s economy has grown significantly over the previous decade. From 
2000–2013, Tanzania’s GDP grew from $10.2 to $33.2 million (U.S.$), and averaged 6.7 
percent annual GDP growth.173 With a population increase from 34.0 to 49.3 million 
during this same period, annual GDP per capita growth averaged 3.7 percent a year.174 
Increased activity in industrial and service sectors led this growth, along with the targeted 
expansion of telecommunications and financial services, and the country’s significant 
construction activity.175 The economy also continues to be more open. Tanzania’s 
exports have increased fivefold since 2000, led by primary commodities, such as gold, 
coffee, tea, cashew nuts, and cotton.176  
The economy is expected to continue its growth trajectory in 2014 and 2015 of 7 
percent, led by expansions in the transportation, communications, manufacturing, and 
agricultural sectors.177 Expenditures in transport and energy infrastructure are well placed 
as these areas have been identified as major constraints to economic growth.178 The 
continuing lack of electricity further impedes economic growth as the manufacturing 
sector is particularly constrained, which limits job creation.179 Construction activity is 
expected to remain robust with infrastructure improvements, to include a gas pipeline in 
response to newfound natural gas reserves.180 However, as noted by the IMF, to meet its 
economic growth and poverty reduction goals, Tanzania will have to use more public 
resources, and use them more effectively to improve health and education services, and 
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its economic infrastructure.181 With the population expected to grow by 3 percent a year, 
an 8 percent GDP growth rate is required to achieve Tanzania’s goal of becoming a 
middle income country.182 With the targeted 8–10 percent economic growth rate of 
MKUKUTA II unlikely, the effective use of available resources will be crucial in 
advancing socio-economic objectives. 
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IV. ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ZAMBIA: FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The benefits of Zambia’s robust 21st century economic growth remain unevenly 
distributed throughout the country, which results in staggeringly high national poverty 
rates. Despite focused economic development strategies, societal development and 
subsequent poverty reduction remain elusive. Beginning with independence in 1960, 
successive national development plans (NDPs), PRSPs, and the national development 
vision (Vision 2030) have failed to capitalize on Zambia’s attributes of political stability, 
abundant resources and economic growth in volatile SSA. Inclusive growth remains 
elusive. The majority of Zambians today remain poor despite their country’s economic 
well-being. This chapter begins with a brief overview of Zambia’s political-economic 
trajectory, beginning with the country’s independence, and progresses through a focused 
analysis of national reforms, successive poverty reduction strategies, and subsequent 
outcomes. 
Zambia is a land-locked country of natural resources and arable land. It is 
bordered by eight countries including Angola to the west, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Tanzania to the north, and Zimbabwe to the south. Zambia is slightly larger 
than Texas (approximately 290 thousand sq. miles), with a mostly plateau savanna and 
dry and temperate climate.183 Sixty-six percent of the country is forested land.184 The 
copper mining industry, which began in the 1930s, and is concentrated in the northern 
part of the country’s Copperbelt Province, continues to underpin Zambia’s economy, 
although the majority of the populace works in the agricultural sector. Other abundant 
resources include cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, emeralds, gold, silver, uranium, and water. The 
main industries are mining, transport, construction, manufacturing, and agriculture.185 
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Ores and metal averaged 72 percent of the country’s merchandise annual exports over the 
last 20 years.186 Copper mining currently contributes 9 percent to formal employment.187 
Over a quarter of the country is agricultural land,188 with the majority of the 14.5 million 
(2013)189 Zambians employed in the informal sector and in agriculture. Most of those 
employed in the agriculture sector are subsistence agriculturalists.190  
The socialist regime of President Kenneth Kuanda was endemic of post-
independence Africa. His tenure, characterized by economic instability and relatively 
poor economic policies and outcomes, however, was much less malignant than other 
continental authoritarian regimes, which depleted national resources for personal 
enrichment and relied on fear for empowerment. The Kuanda era began in 1964 when the 
British granted Northern Rhodesia its independence as the Republic of Zambia, with 
Kenneth Kuanda as President.191 Kuanda’s United Nationalist Independent Party (UNIP) 
retained the presidency until 1991 and ruled Zambia as a one-party state from 1972–91. 
Calamities in the global macroeconomic environment undercut newly-
independent Zambia’s positive economic prospects. High commodity prices and the rapid 
economic growth of the 1950s fueled future moderate growth expectations on the 
continent.192 However, external shocks, such as rising transport costs, and the decline in 
copper prices, would prove devastating to Zambia’s economy.193 As with much of SSA, 
Zambia’s weak economic position was characterized by rising inflation, a decline in both 
producer prices and agricultural output, losses in the mineral sector, and transport 
deterioration due to the high cost of oil. 
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Deteriorating global economic conditions began in the mid-1970s. As a result of 
instability and conflict in the Middle East, the price of crude oil increased from 
approximately $3 a barrel in 1973, to more than $12 in 1974, only to increase again from 
$19 in 1979 to $38 in 1981.194 These increases proved detrimental to all oil importing 
states, such as Zambia, whose fuel imports averaged 16 percent of merchandise imports 
from 1975–79.195 The ripple effects of increased fuel and fertilizer costs impeded 
Zambia’s agriculture sector, as well as the industrial sector, which was restrained by the 
lack of imports.196  
The global recession of the 1970s further contributed to Zambia’s economic 
instability. Copper prices plummeted by three-quarters in the decade from the mid-
1970s–80s (see Figure 6), which crippled its economy.197 Zambia, like other SSA 
mineral exporters, produced copper at a loss due to the fall in global prices.198 Zambia’s 
mineral losses were compounded by falling agricultural export prices.199  
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Figure 6.  Zambia’s Copper Production and Copper Prices200 
The Kuanda regime tried unsuccessfully to weather the global economic 
fluctuations of the 1970s and ‘80s. The country’s first national development plan, the 
“Transitional Development Plan,” focused on infrastructure development, diversifying 
the economy, and increasing Zambia’s manufacturing capacity, while advancing self-
reliant black African nationalism as advocated by Kuanda. The President sought to lessen 
the country’s dependence on the industrial complex of white-ruled southern Africa.201 
Economic growth through industrialization was in line with the prevailing economic 
scholarship at the time. However, the Kuanda regime’s import-substitution economic 
strategy proved economically inefficient. The use of alternate seaports, such as Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, which bypassed the colonial infrastructure in then Southern Rhodesia 
(current day Zimbabwe) and South Africa, resulted in lower export volumes at greater 
cost.202 The country’s economic crisis mode defied the implementation of the Second and 
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Third National Development Plans (1972–76, and 1979–84, respectively), as the 
government continuously borrowed money to maintain the country’s standard of living. 
Zambia’s economic crisis was compounded by rapid population growth, which 
was endemic to SSA. As noted by African historian John Iliffe, referencing the region’s 
uniquely sudden growth, the capital cost of developing “more marginal land and 
expanding existing services to provide millions of new children with food, housing, 
dispensaries, and primary schools absorbed the surplus available for investment before 
there could be any thought of development.”203 By 1974, Zambia’s annual population 
growth peaked at 3.4 percent, as compared to 2.8 percent a year in 1960.204 
In Zambia and across SSA, industrialization efforts decimated the agriculture 
industry. Marketing boards appeased the politically relevant urban areas, as governments 
paid low prices for excess export crops to finance industrialization efforts and to maintain 
low food prices for its urban constituency.205 This political rationale was ultimately self-
defeating as it exploited the countryside.206 Producers were challenged to cover the cost 
of production as governments paid only a fraction of market food prices, coupled with 
exchange rate manipulation.207 The result was declining food production throughout 
SSA, as governments implemented unsuccessful economic policies. Studies suggest 
SSA’s per capita food output decreased by 1 percent a year for 25 years, beginning in 
1960.208 The Zambian economy decreased by an average of 2 percent a year from 1975–
1988, with annual per capita income decreasing from $540 in 1964 to $290 in 1988.209 
Self-sufficient in foodstuffs at independence, Zambia now relied on food imports.210 The 
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strain on Zambia’s balance of payments forced a reduction of essential good imports and 
increased domestic costs.211 
High-cost, loss-making, inefficient state corporations produced SSA’s “lost 
decade” of the ‘80s.212 While mining countries like Zambia and oil exporters continued 
to draw foreign investment, investors increasingly looked to Latin America and Asia.213 
From 1965–1980, SSA’s annual GDP per person rose 1.5 percent, as compared to 1.3 
percent in India during that same period.214 By contrast, GDP per person in SSA declined 
by 1 percent a year during the 1980s, while rising to 3.1 percent a year in India.215  
The significant fluctuations in Zambia’s GDP growth rate reflected the economic 
turmoil, from 9.2 percent annual growth in 1972 to negative 4.6 percent in 1977 (see 
Figure 7).216 Growth fluctuations continued throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, as the 
country’s public debt increased. Zambia’s post-independence economic experience was 
characteristic of SSA. Rapid population growth and changes in the global environment 
led to an exponential rise in public debt for the continent. Africa’s public debt quadrupled 
between 1970 and 1976.217 Iliffe notes that by 1991, “Black Africa’s external debt 
exceeded its annual gross national product (GNP), a proportion more than twice that of 
any other region.”218 Zambia’s acute economic crisis led to the acceptance of yet another 
ultimately unsuccessful structural adjustment program in 1983.219 Seven donor-supported 
adjustment programs were adopted from 1976–1991; each was eventually abandoned.220  
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Figure 7.  Zambia’s GDP Per Capita and Annual Growth, 1962–2006221 
The continued deterioration of Zambia’s economic well-being resulted in regime 
change. During Africa’s “lost decade” of the 1980s, the prices of essential goods 
continued to increase, which culminated in the announcement that Zambia’s staple, maize 
meal, would increase by 100 percent in 1990.222 Economic instability galvanized copper 
miners and ruling party dissidents, who demanded multiparty elections.223 As noted by 
Crawford Young, “By 1985, public sector unrest intensified; there were frequent strikes, 
and the powerful mine workers union escaped party tutelage and flexed its muscles.”224 
In 1991, President Kuanda’s UNIP was voted out of office in favor of the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Elections deemed to be free and fair thus ended 
Kuanda’s 27 years in power. Zambia’s political liberalization was the first in anglophone 
                                                 
221 Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, Constraints to Inclusive Growth, 2. 
222 Sishuwa, “Zambia: Recent History.” 
223 Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 300.  
224 Young, The Postcolonial State, 291. 
 50
Africa.225 The transition appeared a model of democratic regime change and furthered 
continental political reform efforts.226  
In 1990, Zambia was one of the poorest countries in the world. Of the country’s 
eight million people, 70 percent were estimated to be poor, with 58 percent of these 
classified as extremely poor.227 Rural poverty (88 percent) was greater than urban 
poverty (48 percent), with 90 percent of rural small-scale farmers classified as poor, and 
83 percent extremely poor.228 Social indicators reflected the country’s impoverishment, 
as its 1990 HDI score of .41 showed a decline from its 1980 score of .42, which placed 
Zambia slightly ahead of Cambodia and slightly behind Haiti in the index rankings.229 Its 
average annual HDI growth from 1980 to 1990 was negative .37.230 In his 1991 inaugural 
address, President Frederick Chiluba stated: 
The Zambia we inherit is destitute—ravaged by the excesses, ineptitude 
and straight corruption of a party and a people who have been in power for 
too long. When our first president stood up to address you twenty-seven 
years ago, he was addressing a country full of hope and glory. A country 
fresh with the power of youth, and a full and rich dowry. Now the coffers 
are empty. The people are poor. The misery endless.231  
B. THE TURN TO THE MARKET 
As essential aspect of the MMD’s winning campaign platform was fiscal 
discipline. By 1991, the central government’s debt had reached 278 percent of its 
GDP.232 Inflation (consumer prices annual percent) rose from 98 percent in 1991 to 166 
percent in 1992, before reaching a high of 183 percent in 1993 (See Figure 8.).233 Against 
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this backdrop, economic reforms were again attempted, this time by the new government, 
to secure the country’s financial future and to grant access to international finance. The 
failure of the country’s maize harvest and the donor support required to prevent a national 
catastrophe provided additional impetus for reform programs.234  
 
Figure 8.  Inflation 1986 to 2006 (Percent)235 
The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union echoed in 
Africa. While the fall of the Berlin Wall did not cause the democratization wave in SSA, 
it demonstrated the fallibility of autocratic regimes.236 When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, 
42 of SSA’s 47 states had authoritarian regimes.237 By 1994, not one was officially a 
one-party state, with 38 having held competitive elections.238 It was also during this 
period that Western donors and the international financial community concluded that 
economic reform programs alone were insufficient for development. Structural 
adjustment was “denatured by predatory prebendal politics.”239 Better governments were 
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required for economic growth, in addition to better economic policies. Future financial 
assistance, desperately needed by the developing world, would be contingent upon state 
opening.240 The end of President Kenneth Kuanda’s authoritarian regime in 1991 not 
only opened Zambia’s state-based economy, but began the political liberalization of the 
government as well.  
Beginning in 1991 with the new administration, Zambia embraced a variety of 
market liberalization reforms. In addition to the privatization of previously state-owned 
companies, such as the Zambia Sugar Company and Zambia Airways, and the removal of 
loan guarantees for most remaining parastatals, economic reforms included the 
devaluation of the official exchange rate by 30 percent, the elimination of all export and 
import licenses, and the opening of the maize and fertilizer industries to market 
competition.241 Zambia’s turn to the market also resulted in the creation of the Zambia 
Privatization Agency, and the establishment of both the Lusaka Stock Exchange, and the 
Zambia Revenue Authority. In 1993, the government introduced a cash budget to restore 
realistic budgeting and control spending.242  
Despite economic reform efforts, privatization and government programs 
intended to curtail inflation and macroeconomic instability were only marginally 
successful. As noted in a 2002 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, the 
implementation of the cash budget actually retained high inflation after initially reducing 
hyperinflation, did not induce fiscal discipline, and actually exacerbated the country’s 
increasing poverty numbers through the disruption of social services and reduction in 
government efficiency.243 The cash budget policy remained in place at the end of the 
decade, and as noted by the World Bank, so did high debt burdens, “and a weak capacity 
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to design and implement a strategic budget execution framework.”244 Although the 
Zambian government knew economic reform was paramount to ensuring its country’s 
financial stability and a sustainable growth path, the country simply lacked the 
infrastructure and capacity to implement desired policies. Additionally, a World Bank 
study of 48 non-mining parastatals privatized in the 1990s found a decline in 
performance partially attributable to a sub-optimal domestic environment.245 Constraints 
included fiscal distortions that disfavored local production, lack of long-term financing, 
and excessive bureaucratic interference.246 
C. 2002 POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER 
Zambia’s economy stabilized toward the end of the 1990s, as reform and 
liberalization policies matured, the macroeconomic environment settled and global 
copper prices increased. Additionally, evidence indicates Zambia successfully managed 
to diversify and expand its export base to reduce its reliance on the country’s mining 
industry.247 The last year of negative GDP growth occurred in 1998, with growth 
averaging over 6 percent annually from 1999–2013.248 Annual inflation of consumer 
prices, which peaked at 183 percent in 1993, has steadily declined since 2000, with the 
exception of 2008 and 2009, owing to the global financial crisis. For the last three years 
of available data, 2011–13, inflation (consumer prices annual percent) has remained 
below 7 percent.249 The country’s first PRSP sought to translate such improving 
economic advancements into poverty reduction, as the numbers of the country’s 
impoverished had steadily increased since independence.250  
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In the 1980s and ‘90s, as the Zambian government focused on its economic 
survival; poverty had increased throughout the country. The majority of Zambians 
continue to live in poverty (see Figure 9). The country’s highest poverty rates are in rural 
areas (80 percent), where most of the population lives.251 In 2002, although poverty was 
still more prevalent in rural areas than urban (83 versus 56 percent, respectively), it was 
increasing in urban areas due to failing industries and increasing unemployment.252 
 
Figure 9.  Zambia Poverty Rates in Rural and Urban Areas, 1991–2006253 
To combat the country’s rise in poverty, the major objectives of the PRSP were to 
encourage continued economic growth, promote the continued diversification of its 
products and exports, improve social service delivery, and espouse crosscutting policies 
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for HIV/AIDS, gender, and environmental issues.254 Strengths of the PRSP included 
comprehensive poverty analyses and the identification of priority sectors in relation to 
their respective pro-poor growth contributions.255 However, as noted by the IMF, the 
strategy lacked specific poverty-reducing activities within priority sectors and adequate 
financing details, which exemplified institutional and capacity weaknesses within the 
government.256 
The PRSP focused the government on obtaining reliable poverty information. In 
compiling poverty data for the 2002 PRSP, Zambia utilized its Central Statistical Office’s 
(CSO) compilations, which defined the country’s poverty line, “as the amount of monthly 
income required to purchase basic food to meet the minimum caloric requirement for a 
family of six.”257 The CSO found the number of Zambians below this threshold had 
increased from 70 percent of the population in 1991 to 73 percent of the population in 
1997.258 The 2002 PRSP cautioned that the state of poverty was actually worse than CSO 
numbers revealed, as the basic food requirements for this poverty threshold were 
exceptionally modest and based on the minimum caloric requirement, which excludes 
meat and fish.259 The Zambian government acknowledges a broader understanding of 
poverty to include the material requirements for basic needs, and additional human needs 
factors, such as life expectancy, literacy, access to health services, and personal security 
among others.260 CSO figures, however, do not encapsulate these basic human needs 
factors. 
The 2002 PRSP acknowledged the economic failures of the previous three 
decades. Foreign borrowing increased to offset global copper and oil prices, as import 
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substitution industrialization was embraced to reduce the country’s over-dependency on 
mining exports. Even with initial privatization efforts, the PRSP acknowledged that 
Zambia’s average annual growth rate from 1990–1999 was only 1 percent, the lowest rate 
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In addition to attributing the 
growth in poverty to the lack of economic growth coupled with a growing population, the 
PRSP acknowledged inadequate expenditures on pro-poor interventions, and unfavorable 
land tenure and ownership laws that resulted in weak access to real assets.261 
Appropriately, Zambian agriculture was the main focus of the 2002 PRSP. 
Employing half of the country’s workforce in 1990, those employed in agriculture-related 
activity rose to 70 percent by 1998.262 Although the country’s major employer, the 
agriculture sector’s capacity to contribute to growth and development remained 
underexploited.263 The sector remained a binding constraint on the economy. The PRSP 
cited the country’s abundant arable land and supportive ecology, along with requisite 
workers, which, the paper noted, situates Zambia for economic success if utilized by 
appropriate policies. Poverty reduction will only occur if growth in the agricultural sector 
is complemented by pro-poor policies that include the poor in the sector’s growth.264 
Although the paper noted the importance of improving the productivity of smallholder 
farmers’ land, it also simultaneously placed emphasis on encouraging large-scale 
agricultural farming to take advantage of unexploited land resources.265 Commercial 
agriculture is an economic diversification opportunity, to compliment Zambia’s mining 
industry.266  
Three decades after independence, Zambia had succeeded in diversifying its 
exports. Although still dominated by mining products, agriculture exports made up an 
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increasing share by the late 1990s.267 Food and other farm products increased from 4 
percent of exports in the 1980s to 20 percent at the turn of the century (see Figure 10).268 
The mining sector had also diversified, with base metals and precious stones making up 
an increasing percentage of the mining sector.269 Such strong diversification buttressed 
Zambia’s robust 21st century economic growth. 
 
Figure 10.  Composition of Exports in Zambia270 
The country’s first PRSP was not without its challenges. Fiscal constraints at the 
time severely limited the socio-economic programs Zambia could initiate or continue, 
without external support. The delicate economic position, attributed to economic 
stagnation, and dependence on external resources to fund the PRSP, was specifically 
referenced.271 PRSP programs from 2002–2004 were estimated to cost $1.2 billion, with 
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donors financing 67 percent of the total cost.272 A significant portion of Zambia’s 
internal financing calculations was also attributed to debt relief.273  
The government was also restrained by competing goals in the agricultural sector. 
Although agricultural development was targeted as the “engine of income expansion for 
the poor,”274 a concurrent goal was the development of the country’s commercial 
agricultural capacity. Livelihoods for the majority of Zambia’s poor are dependent upon 
small-scale agriculture and informal sector activities, which tend to be short-term and 
seasonal.275 A delicate balance is required to protect and develop the capacity of 
subsistence farmers while also promoting commercial industrial development. The 
strategy recognized these competing interests, but proclaimed that the country, “can 
afford to encourage rural large-scale agriculture without creating land problems although 
it will require shifting some people.”276 Commercial farms are mainly situated along 
major transport routes and are held under 99 year leases with the government. They use 
modern equipment, technology, irrigation, and fertilizing methods and produce most of 
Zambia’s agricultural exports in addition to 80 percent milk exports, 75 percent wheat, 
and 70 percent soybeans and poultry.277 Peasant farmers hold nearly two-thirds of 
Zambia’s agricultural land, mainly through traditional agreements managed by local 
chiefs.278 These farmers tend to live on less than 5 hectares and use hand-tools or animal 
draft power to grow mainly food staples. The Zambian government estimated that 60–70 
percent of smallholder farmers did not benefit from the liberalization policies of the 
1990s, as they live far from markets where reasonable cost inputs may be obtained and 
their farm products may be sold at profit.279 The government envisioned increasing rural 
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productivity by altering the traditional authority governing ownership through 
demarcating farm blocks for commercial exploitation.280 
A final impediment to Zambia’s poverty reduction efforts at this time was the lack 
of an overarching national economic framework. The Fourth National Development Plan 
(1989–1993) was the most recent national plan, which resulted in a decade (1993–2002) 
without economic guidance. As with the 2002 PRSP, successive PRSPs would present 
similar medium-term strategic approaches that were expected to compliment the 
forthcoming long-term strategic guidance of the completed national framework. 
In the 2002 PRSP, Zambia committed to augmenting the structural reforms and 
economic liberalization efforts previously attempted, while also recognizing the need to 
develop inclusive growth policies.281 Previous decades without such a comprehensive 
strategy had proven disastrous to the country’s most vulnerable. PRSP objectives of 
macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction were to be achieved through growth-
stimulating interventions and pro-poor interventions. While these interventions focused 
heavily on the economic sector through the tourism, agriculture, and mining industries, 
the PRSP also targeted infrastructure development and the social services sector, all of 
which are affected by crosscutting issues, such as HIV/AIDS and the environment.282 As 
the new century began, Zambia faced the herculean tasks of not only arresting the 
incidence of poverty from increasing in the country, but also reducing the number of 
those already impoverished, while maintaining growth. The national development vision 
aspired to establish the long-term strategic framework to guide the country in 
accomplishing both.  
D. VISION 2030: A PROSPEROUS MIDDLE-INCOME NATION BY 2030 
In December 2006, Zambia released its first national long-term socio-economic 
development plan. Vision 2030: A Prosperous Middle-Income Nation by 2030 
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encapsulates the benchmark social and economic indicators the country aspires to attain 
by 2030 to achieve middle-income status. The founding principles of Vision 2030 include 
sustainable development, upholding democratic principles, respect for human rights, 
fostering family values, a positive attitude to work, peaceful co-existence, and upholding 
good traditional values. These principles will guide short- and medium-term national 
development plans in establishing corresponding social and economic development 
policies.283 
Vision 2030 development scenarios are presented from three perspectives: that of 
the 2005/06 baseline, the “preferred” perspective, and the “optimistic” perspective. 
Preferred targets include annual GDP growth rates beginning with 6 percent in 2006 and 
gradually progressing to 10 percent between 2021 and 2030, retained inflation rates 
below 5 percent, the reduction of the national poverty head count to below 20 percent of 
the population, to acquire and maintain a Gini coefficient of less than .40, the provision 
of safe potable water and improved sanitation facilities accessible to the entire Zambian 
populace, education for all, and the provision for equitable access to health care for all 
Zambians.284  
Vision 2030 also details the prerequisite underlying conditions for the successful 
achievement of the country’s middle-income status. Those requirements include 
increasing the country’s annual health expenditures, increasing the shares of 
manufactures and industry participation in the GDP, in addition to the sustainment of 
prudent fiscal, monetary, and financial policies.285 The increased health expenditure 
targets are in line with comparable middle-income countries (Botswana, Gabon, and 
Panama). However, the World Bank noted in 2004 that Zambia had recently been unable 
to release all the planned resources in the health sector.286 Increased health expenditures 
are mandatory to arrest the increasing incidence of malaria, combat tuberculosis and HIV, 
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as well as ensure sufficient infrastructure. such as hospitals. The Vision appropriately 
emphasizes prudent fiscal and economic policies, as overruns of the wage bill and 
slippages in fiscal policy had also recently occurred, which negatively affected the 
government’s ability to execute poverty-reduction programs.287 
Vision 2030 frankly acknowledges Zambia’s economic realities. In 2003, 
Zambia’s external debt service accounted for 3 percent of its GDP. With the cancellation 
of almost all that debt, Zambia is now enabled and expected to allocate increased funds to 
domestic expenditures. Domestic revenues may now be combined with external grants 
(over 6 percent of GDP in 2004 and 2005) for infrastructure improvements and expanded 
health and education programs. An additional economic reality is the fundamental 
transformation of its economy as it approaches middle-income status. As it grows, 
Zambia’s economy is expected to migrate from a primary commodities-based economy 
(namely that of the mining and agriculture sectors) to one of manufacturing. Mining and 
agriculture contributions are expected to decline as a percent of GDP from 3.4 and 23.6 
percent, respectively, in 2004, to 2.4 and 10.1, respectively, in 2030. For manufacturing 
to achieve its targeted 6 percent growth by 2030, Zambia’s industrial capacity and 
infrastructure must be improved.288 
Almost a decade after the release of Vision 2030, Zambia has made significant 
progress in its implementation. While annual percentage GDP growth did not achieve the 
prescribed preferred rates of 8 percent from 2011–2014, the average percentage of GDP 
annual growth from 2006–2014 was 7.7 percent, well within the 6–10 percent targeted 
growth rate.289 Inflation rates (consumer prices annual percent) have been considerably 
higher than the established Vision 2030 target, although it has been below 7 percent for 
the past three years.290 The percentage of Zambians with access to an improved water 
source and improved sanitation access has consistently increased since 2006, but remains 
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well below the targeted 100 percent at 43 percent and 63 percent, respectively.291 The 
2013 98 percent adjusted net enrollment rate for primary and secondary education 
success contrasts significantly with the delta between the targeted national head count 
poverty rate of 20 percent of the population and the 60.5 percent rate as of 2010.292 
Vision 2030 did not single-handedly adjust Zambia’s economic structure to ensure 
equitable socio-economic development benefits are permeated through its society. 
However, in finally establishing the long-term strategic economic framework for the 
country, it identifies targets and priority sectors of the economy for successive short- and 
medium-term policies to focus on in advancing its citizenry development and poverty 
reduction. Initial advancements have been made. The challenge is to sustain the country’s 
economic development progression. 
In 2011, Zambia met the objective of Vision 2030 upon its classification as a 
lower middle-income country. The reclassification was attributable to aid interventions 
and the increasing global demand for copper.293 Still economically dependent on copper, 
favorable market prices coupled with prudent macroeconomic policies resulted in a 
positive economic environment and subsequent growth. However, Zambia’s economy 
still lacks significant progress in transitioning away from a primary commodities based 
system into a manufacturing dominant economy. Although agriculture, as a value added 
percent of GDP, consistently declined from 17.3 percent in 2002 to 9.6 percent in 2013, 
and will assumingly therefore meet the 2030 target of 10.1 percent, mineral rents as a 
percent of GDP have not shown such progress.294 Mineral rents were .5 percent of GDP 
in 2002 and grew to 20 percent in 2012, well above the Vision 2030 target of 2.4 percent 
by 2030.295 Manufacturing (value added as a percent of GDP) has also shown 
disappointing results in its consistent decades-long decline from 11.3 percent in 2003 to 
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8.2 percent in 2013.296 Despite the apparent success of Vision 2030 in achieving its main 
objective, the country’s significant national poverty headcount rate reflects a declining 
social development reality. Successive five-year development plans, built upon the 
framework of Vision 2030, detail policies and programs targeting wealth creation and 
poverty reduction, in pursuit of an improved socio-economic position for all Zambians. 
E. FIFTH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), also released in December 
2006, covered the five year implementation period 2006–2010. It was the first national 
economic development policy to be implemented since the 1964 “Transitional 
Development Plan,” over 40 years prior. As with the Second and Third National 
Development Plans, the Fourth NDP (1989–1993) was abandoned amidst the economic 
re-shuffling of liberalization.297 Upon its release by the IMF in August 2007, the FNDP 
also served as the successor 2007 PRSP to Zambia’s 2002 PRSP.  
In the FNDP’s foreword, President Patrick L. Mwanawasa acknowledged the 
challenges of running a national economy without a guiding national strategy. The 
President stated that the absence of such guidance focused planning on short-term needs 
and shortsighted requirements to the detriment of socio-economic development.298 The 
FNDP aspired to provide the socio-economic development framework and 
implementation guidelines in concert with the national vision of becoming a prosperous 
middle-income country. It was prepared based on Zambia’s medium-term 
macroeconomic, fiscal, and aid policy objectives.299  
As with the 2002 PRSP, the FNDP core focus areas were strengthening the 
macroeconomic stability of the country and encouraging continued economic growth, 
while encouraging the socio-economic development of its citizens. The 2002 PRSP failed 
to secure broad-based development, as poverty rates continued to increase in rural areas, 
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although they decreased in urban areas. Accordingly, the theme of the FNDP is “broad 
based wealth and job creation through citizenry participation and technological 
advancement.”300 The FNDP addressed many sectors of the economy, which resulted in 
over 400 pages of development policy guidance. As with the previous poverty reduction 
strategy, the FNDP identified agriculture as the engine of growth that provided the best 
opportunity for improving the livelihoods of the country’s poor. Economic sub-themes of 
the FNDP included infrastructure, tourism, manufacturing, mining, and energy, while 
social themes included poverty reduction, social safety nets, issues of disability, social 
protection, and good governance.301  
Zambia’s economic performance remained strong for the duration of the FNDP. 
GDP growth averaged 8.7 percent annually, with an average annual inflation rate of 11 
percent.302 Domestic debt increased as expenses outpaced revenues, owing to 
government securities expenditures, as well as payments on awards and 
compensations.303 However, the 2009 domestic debt as 16.2 percent of GDP was a 
decrease from the 20 percent in 2006.304 The labor market also showed improvement 
with a 10 percent increase during the FNDP timeframe, with over 26 percent total 
employment growth.305 Although the informal sector grew by 48 percent and formal 
sector growth was 26 percent, unemployment accounted for 16 percent of the total labor 
force, with 30 percent in rural areas, and the remaining 70 percent in urban areas.306  
As with the 2002 PRSP, Zambia’s macroeconomic stability and stable growth 
during the FNDP did not correlate to significant welfare improvements or poverty 
reductions, as would be expected with such sustained growth. Aggregate poverty 
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numbers have reduced only slightly due to decreases in urban poverty, and remain high 
overall. In 2010, Zambia’s national poverty headcount was 60 percent.307 The urban 
poverty rate in rural areas was 74 percent in 2010, compared to the urban poverty rate of 
35 percent, with almost 90 percent of Zambians below the extreme poverty line living in 
rural areas.308 Despite a significant GDP average growth rate, the average annual GDP 
per capita growth rate was 5.7 percent.309 In 2010, with over half of the country’s 
population living in poverty, Zambia’s HDI score was .53, below that of Bangladesh 
(.54) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (.57).310 
Current scholarship supports productive employment as the main instrument for 
inclusive growth.311 However, numerous factors condition employment’s effectiveness. 
Analyzing growth sectors and employment data, the World Bank attributed poverty 
reduction during the previous decade (1996–2006) to the population’s migration into 
urban low and medium cost areas, which offered increased employment opportunities and 
higher productivity than rural areas.312 In 2009, the main constraint to a continuing 
reduction in poverty was low-income growth for the poor, which was identified as low 
returns to self-employment, as well as the limited growth of and access to wage 
employment.313 The African Development Bank (ADB) also cited low labor productivity 
and the concentration of growth in capital-intensive and urban-based sectors as 
detrimental to the country’s socioeconomic development.314 In its 2010 Zambia Country 
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Report, the ADB also noted that revenues had not increased in proportion to the 
economic growth, while government expenditures continued to grow, therefore hindering 
the government’s ability to provide public services, especially in pro-poor areas, such as 
health, education, and water among others.315  
Utilizing inclusive growth analytics, the World Bank concluded that the lack of 
job creation and returns to labor in Zambia were attributable to coordination failures, 
such as limited market access, and poor access to services and information.316 High 
indirect costs also negatively affect job creation as it undermines Zambia’s 
competitiveness.317 Similarly, in 2011, the Zambian government attributed the 
disappointing employment increases during the FNDP to low labor productivity and the 
labor market’s low absorptive capacity for new entrants.318 Additional identified 
constraints included inadequate infrastructure, low levels of human capital (scarcity of 
skilled manpower), high business costs, public expenditure management inefficiencies, 
and the inadequate administration of land management.319 To ensure the poor benefitted 
from future growth, the World Bank recommended continued government emphasis on 
access to quality secondary and tertiary education, as well as ongoing health care support 
to combat HIV/AIDS.320 Cited market coordination failures also hampering shared 
growth included poor government effectiveness, in addition to agriculture distortionary 
policies.321  
F. SIXTH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND REVISED SIXTH 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN  
Zambia’s economy continued its positive growth path from 2006–2010, which 
resulted in macroeconomic stability and progress in select social-development indicators, 
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such as maternal and infant mortality rates, and school enrollment rates. However, the 
country’s poverty and employment rates remained stagnant. Accordingly, Zambia’s Sixth 
National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011–2015 targets the distribution of growth’s 
benefits. Unlike the country’s previous development strategies, the SNDP specifically 
focuses on inclusive policies more so than economic growth. Its strategic focus of 
“infrastructure and human development” supports the SNDP’s theme of “sustained 
economic growth and poverty reduction.” While acknowledging the importance of all 
Zambia’s economic sectors, the SNDP prioritizes agriculture, livestock and fisheries, 
mining, tourism, manufacturing, and commerce and trade for prioritized growth.322 
The SNDP aspires to address Zambia’s human development and infrastructure 
constraints.323 As seen in previous development plans, the SNDP focuses on improving 
access to health and education opportunities in addition to increasing labor productivity 
and skills development for the workforce.324 Infrastructure constraints not only impede 
health and education advancement, they also restrict regional integration and trade 
networks dependent upon road links within regional corridors.325  
In October 2014, Zambia’s Ministry of Finance released the Revised Sixth 
National Development Plan (R-SNDP) 2013–2015.326 The R-SNDP continues the pursuit 
of the Vision 2030 goal of becoming a prosperous middle-income country by 2030, and 
contains programs to inform sector planning and the budget process in pursuit of that 
goal.327 The SNDP was revised to reflect the program spending priorities of the new 
administration, the Patriotic Front, which defeated the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy in 2011.328 Acknowledging the failures of the market-led economy in 
reducing Zambia’s poverty rate, the new government intends to, “participate in economic 
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development through public investments” in pursuit of the retained goals of economic 
transformation through diversification and industrialization.329  
Zambia’s macroeconomic performance, as determined by select indicators, was 
better than anticipated for the 2011–2012 period.330 Annual GDP growth and inflation 
outperformed projected targets, with budget performance broadly in line with 
projections.331 However, economic growth did not result in commensurate job 
creation.332 Agriculture, manufacturing, energy, construction, tourism, and mining were 
identified as growth sectors during this two-year review period, which resulted in the 
government’s decision to target job creation in other strategic focus sectors for growth 
creation.333 By 2015, implemented economic policies, measured through their respective 
targets, are expected to have contributed to the reduction of inequality in the country, as 
well as to the reduction of the rural-urban divide.334 The government expects programs to 
be financed through more efficient revenue collection in addition to dividends from state 
owned enterprises, and thus, reduce Zambia’s dependence on foreign financing.335 
G. CONCLUSION 
Zambia is a SSA success story. With continuous improvements in income growth 
per capita and increases in average real income, it is one of the 17 emerging countries in 
Africa.336 It is one of the top 10 economic performers in SSA, and averages an annual 
GDP growth rate of over 7 percent from 2000–2013.337 The country enjoys sustained 
governance stability, evidenced by successive peaceful alternations of power, and is 
endowed with natural resources, to include a significant portion of the region’s water. 
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However, the economic prosperity enjoyed by the country has not translated into 
corresponding advances in social development, although improvements have been seen in 
non-monetary poverty indicators, such as child mortality rates and education attainment. 
In 2014, Zambia ranked 141st out of the 187 countries listed in the UN’s HDI.338 Its 
average annual HDI growth has improved significantly since 2000 at 2.19 percent, as 
compared with negative .37 and .39 for the decades 1980–1990 and 1990–2000, 
respectively.339 However, as of 2010, over 60 percent of the population still remained 
below the national poverty line, as gains in urban and rural poverty reduction remain 
uneven.340 
Zambia has made significant advances toward the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the eight internationally agreed targets to reduce poverty, hunger, 
maternal and child deaths, disease, gender inequality, and environmental degradation, but 
will not reach all the established benchmarks for 2015. The UN’s 2013 progress report 
for Zambia notes that gains have been made in the prevalence of HIV and tuberculosis, 
underweight children, and gender equality in primary school, while other indicators, such 
as sanitation, environmental sustainability, and gender equality in political representation, 
have actually shown a declining trend.341 
Zambia will not meet the MDG poverty reduction target by 2015. Although 
extreme poverty was reduced from 58 percent in 1991 to 42.3 percent in 2010, the target 
for 2015 is 29 percent.342 While substantial gains were made in Zambia’s poverty rate 
reduction throughout the country from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, recent reductions 
have been slight and uneven.343 Improvements have been made in the depth of poverty 
with decreases in urban areas, while rural areas have experienced only limited 
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improvements. The Gini coefficient remains at .65, well above the 2015 inequality target 
of .34.344  
As noted by the World Bank, the rural workforce, predominantly employed in 
agriculture, remains largely unaffected by Zambia’s recent economic growth.345 Rural 
poverty rates remain stagnant despite recent increases in agriculture production due to 
adequate rainfall and low rural unemployment rates (less than 2 percent in 2010).346 
Extreme poverty remains concentrated in rural areas, marked by limited infrastructure, 
such as roads, medical facilities, and electricity. The World Bank notes that rural poverty 
in Zambia remains both “pervasive and severe” despite recent socioeconomic gains.347 
Zambia’s recent economic growth resulting from strong mining, construction, 
financial services, and tourism sector expansion has benefited the country’s urban 
population. In 2010, over 80 percent of real GDP growth occurred in urban areas, home 
to the industrial and service sectors’ skilled labor.348 Productive employment returns 
have accrued to the urban skilled labor force, even as the urban unemployment rate 
remains high.349 Sector expansion fueling the country’s economic growth has not created 
sufficient access to wage- or self-employment throughout the country. The jobs that have 
been created remain primarily in urban areas, whereas the majority of the country’s 
impoverished reside in rural areas. The MDG progress report attributes the limited 
poverty reduction that has occurred to population migrations from rural areas to the areas 
with more employment opportunities, namely urban areas.350 The report summarizes 
Zambia’s obstacles to poverty reduction as the prevalence of higher poverty rates among 
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female-headed households, low labor productivity, high population growth rate, low 
growth elasticity, and wide income inequality.351 
Inclusive growth in Zambia remains hampered by limited productive employment 
opportunities for the rural poor. Although industrial and service sectors continue to 
contribute to the country’s growth trajectory, binding constraints hinder their effects on 
job creation. Specific constraints have been identified as coordination failures, high 
indirect costs primarily from infrastructure, and poor government effectiveness that 
contribute to market coordination failures.352 The jobs created are only benefiting a small 
portion of the skilled labor force, primarily in urban areas.  
To encourage national development that includes all Zambians, increased 
productivity and lower production costs must be managed through prudent monetary and 
fiscal policies.353 Economic growth is insufficient to reduce Zambia’s incidence of 
poverty without adequate alterations in the country’s income distribution, which begins 
with equitable access to productive employment opportunities.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Tanzania and Zambia are two of the 17 emerging economies in SSA and share 
similar characteristics, yet are on significantly different poverty reduction trajectories. 
While the benefits of Tanzania’s high economic growth have translated into societal 
development and subsequent poverty reduction, Zambia’s has not. Tanzania has 
performed better on poverty reduction, but has grown less slowly. By contrast, and 
perhaps surprisingly, Zambia has grown faster, which has led to surprising development 
outcomes, worse performance on poverty reduction and inequality, while experiencing 
other socioeconomic advancements. Due to Zambia’s favorable economic environment 
and subsequent growth, it was recently reclassified as a lower middle-income country, 
whereas Tanzania remains a low-income country, yet is able to extend the benefits of 
economic growth to its populace more effectively. An economic analysis of both 
countries illustrated less effective than expected poverty reduction results in Tanzania, 
while Zambia has made substantive socioeconomic advancements while its incidence of 
poverty remains severe and intractable. Development remains complicated; it is difficult 
to make generalized, unconditional causal claims about how growth leads to development 
outcomes.  
Tanzania and Zambia both benefit from a stable macroeconomic environment. 
Each country has enjoyed democratic governance with successive, peaceful alternations 
of power in volatile SSA, after embracing political liberalization following state-
controlled post-independence governments. Both countries have experienced robust 
economic growth rates averaging over 6.5 percent a year from 2000–2013, as well as low 
inflation rates.354 However, positive economic performance has not correlated into 
expected rates of poverty reductions in either country (see Figure 11).  
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Figure 11.  Select Macroeconomic and Socioeconomic  
Indicators, Tanzania and Zambia355 
Tanzania’s socioeconomic development is not keeping pace with its economic 
growth. Fueled by recent growth in its communications, construction, and financial 
services sectors, Tanzania’s economy continues its positive trajectory.356 However, given 
the country’s stable macroeconomic environment, the distribution of economic growth’s 
benefits throughout the country has been disappointing. Accordingly, although 
substantive progress has been made in achieving the MDGs, poverty, gender equality, 
and maternal health goals remain unachievable by 2015.357 Possible constraints limiting 
inclusive growth in Tanzania include weak national infrastructure that hampers service 
delivery, and insufficient participation in the global economy.358 The country also 
continues to rely significantly on external financial assistance.  
Tanzania’s relatively poor performance on poverty reduction is surprising in light 
of the country’s economic growth. While the national headcount poverty rate has indeed 
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declined, it still accounts for over a third of the population. The majority of the country’s 
poor are concentrated in Tanzania’s rural areas and employed in the country’s 
agricultural sector, as is most of the population. Inequality, which has increased since 
2000, may account for Tanzania’s slow poverty reduction. Although Tanzania continues 
to make incremental progress in the achievement of the MDGs and the UN’s HDI, 
progress is slower than expected.  
Likewise, Zambia’s economic growth has produced mixed socioeconomic results. 
Upon the turn to multiparty democracy and market liberalization policies of the 1990s, 
the country began to diversify its exports and develop its industrial capacity to reduce its 
economic reliance on copper, its primary commodity. Production of non-ores and 
minerals primary exports drastically increased, while reducing reliance on ores and 
mineral exports.359 While GDP per capita and inflation declined during this period, so too 
did national poverty rates.360 However, since 2006, the national poverty rate has reflected 
only a slight decline, which is attributable to large reductions in urban poverty and 
statistically insignificant reductions in rural poverty.361 Growth constraints limiting 
national development include significant inequality, limited productive employment 
opportunities, and the over-reliance on the country’s mining sector.  
Although successful in lessening the country’s economic dependence on its 
copper industry, expansion efforts and export diversification have benefitted urban areas 
with productive employment for the skilled labor force. Expansion in the mining, 
construction, financial services, and tourism sectors reduced urban poverty and brought 
employment opportunities to Zambia’s urban areas with skilled labor, although urban 
unemployment rates remain high. Industry and service sectors, however, only account for 
less than 10 percent of the country’s employment, as the majority of the country is 
involved in the agricultural sector.  
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Given Zambia’s practically stagnant prevalence of poverty, the country has made 
surprisingly better than anticipated improvements in various socioeconomic aspects of 
the country, to include education and health. Zambia has achieved MDGs pertaining to 
underweight children, gender equality, and HIV.362 Its HDI rating also reflects positive 
development advancements. 
Recent economic growth in both Tanzania and Zambia has benefited sectors 
whose skilled workforce resides in urban areas. The benefits of economic growth are 
primarily being distributed to society’s advantaged. The majority of the impoverished in 
both countries resides in rural areas and is involved in agricultural activity, which has 
seen comparatively low sectoral productivity. As reforms benefitted those with 
employment skills or capital, unskilled workers face increased competition for 
employment, and are forced to accept lower wages or unemployment. Economic growth 
encouraged by neoliberal reforms will succeed in promoting human capital and overall 
development only through inclusive growth policies; inequality will continue to rise if the 
poor’s income per capita remains unchanged.  
Recent IMF studies support the importance of labor sector variation in effecting 
shared prosperity. In an examination of consumption levels in light of increasing growth, 
the IMF found a rise in average living standards of poor households in Tanzania, which 
contrasted with the living standards of the poor households in Zambia, which experienced 
slower growth.363 When consumption rose, poverty fell. Specifically, the IMF found 
agricultural incomes contributed to the inclusiveness of growth.364 Future research could 
analyze agricultural sector policies of both countries. If agricultural incomes are 
significant to growth inclusiveness, what specific aspects of Zambia’s pro-growth 
strategies in their agricultural sector failed, and what specific aspects in Tanzania 
succeeded?  
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Economic prosperity is not necessarily inclusive; it remains elusive for some 
despite advancements. Although SSA has seen increasing economic growth in the 21st 
century, the quality and sustainability of that growth has been questioned. One specific 
question for further research is whether youth will be able to engage in income producing 
employment.365 SSA does have favorable demographics for strong economic growth, if 
employment opportunities are provided.366 Yet translating growth into employment 
income remains challenging.367 Government policies that encourage agricultural 
productivity, address the geography of impoverished areas, and improve market 
efficiencies effectively reduce poverty and encourage pro-poor growth.368 
As underscored by Dani Rodrik, a distinction exists between igniting economic 
growth in the short term and sustaining such growth over the medium and long term. He 
notes, “Rapid industrialization without the accumulation of fundamental capabilities 
(institutions, human capital) produces spurts of growth that eventually run out of 
steam.”369 For sustained growth in Tanzania and Zambia to encourage improvements in 
human welfare, such as poverty reduction, each country has to develop inclusive growth 
policies that limit the effects of inequality, and a supportive institutional framework, in 
addition to removing historical barriers to growth. The agriculture sector in both 
countries provides an opportunity to increase total economic production, as each is 
endowed with adequate capital (land and labor). Technological advancements in the 
agriculture industry would increase asset productivity and benefit the rural poor, as long 
as the policies are distributive and do not continue to displace them from productive 
employment.  
The most appropriate assessment of economic growth and prosperity continues to 
evolve. Recent developments led by the World Bank include a single summary indicator 
of inclusive growth, reflective of improved income for the bottom 40 percent of a 
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population.370 Focusing on the least well-off in society, coupled with household survey 
data information, is thought to provide the best estimation of growth’s societal inclusion. 
Growth will, therefore, not solely be judged on economic progress, but how well that 
growth is reaching the most impoverished.371 If Tanzania and Zambia continue their 
positive economic progression, such methodologies will ensure the least well-off in both 
countries are accorded appropriate policy considerations.  
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